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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research interest 
 
 Post-conflict societies are faced with innumerable problems: By definition, their 
country has just emerged from an internal or external conflict, which might have 
claimed many lives and left survivors traumatized. Even the most basic infrastructure 
that might have existed prior to the conflict, such as hospitals, administrative buildings, 
courts and prisons might be destroyed. Trained personnel, such as doctors, nurses, 
governmental administrative personnel, but also judges and clerks might have been 
forced to flee the country, might still be too afraid to present themselves at their 
workplace or might just not receive their salary, which obviously decreases the 
incentive to work dramatically, in particular if those staff are sole bread winners in their 
families.  
 
If atrocities have been committed during the conflict, their perpetrators are likely 
to still be on the loose within their communities, potentially still spreading fear and re-
traumatizing victims. Any rebel groups that were active in the territory at times of the 
conflict might not have given up their arms and might continue to prey on the 
population, in particular in areas of rich natural resources, where the benefit from non-
existing state or governmental structures can be extremely high. The police and military, 
in particular their command structure and higher ranking officers, might have been 
demounted, especially if the conflict brought about a regime change and police and 
military were felt to be associated with the former regime.  
 
 This explains why, in a worst case scenario, a post-conflict situation can mean 
that a traumatized population is confronted with no infrastructure, no trained personnel, 
no security institutions in place and rebels or criminal gangs on the loose.1 Far too often, 
                                         
1
 To understand the situation of the general public in the countries used as examples, the Human 
Development Indicator (HDI) can be used as initial guidance as it provides information on the 
development of a country by measuring its average achievements in health, knowledge, and income as 
three basic aspects of human development(see http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/FAQs_2011_HDI.pdf, 
16/1/2012). Austria is ranked on position 19, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is on position 187 
(which is the worst rank of all countries and territories included in the HDI, see 
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this worst case scenario happens in post-conflict situations.2 Understandably, the impact 
of each of the problems outlined above on the society depends on how well the 
respective sectors were developed prior to the conflict and the extent to which they were 
damaged or destroyed during the conflict. Untying these multiple gordian knots to 
emerge from a post-conflict situation is extremely difficult, and these factors explain 
why both taking decisions on internal governance and providing international support 
are daunting tasks in these situations. However, they are crucial to facilitating the 
transition of a country or region from a post-conflict situation to a more peaceful, 
prosperous future.  
 
 The present study aims at examining one of the fundamental institutions needed 
to allow for this transition: the judicial system. As outlined above, judicial systems can 
be severely damaged or even destroyed during conflicts, in particular, if the judiciary is 
not or is not perceived as independent from the regime in place. Judges, lawyers and 
clerks can be removed from office, forced to flee the country or be killed during or 
following a regime change, which can leave a country with virtually no trained 
personnel able to conduct trials and advance procedures. Bar associations can be 
dismantled, leaving no independent (disciplinary) authority for lawyers and no one to 
establish whether someone has the required competencies to act as a lawyer. 
Courthouses can be damaged or destroyed, leaving no suitable place to administer 
justice and keep confidential information. Vital evidence and documents can be 
destroyed or lost, making it impossible to conclude pending trials or handle appeals. 
Furthermore, necessary infrastructure such as prisons might also have been destroyed.  
 
 While these developments would already render the re-establishment of a 
judicial system difficult that has functioned reasonably well and reasonably independent 
prior to a conflict, one might also have to face a post-conflict situation in which there 
was no functional independent judicial system prior to the conflict, and in which such a 
system would need to be built from scratch.  
                                                                                                                        
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/FAQs_2011_HDI.pdf, 16/1/2012),  Rwanda is on position 166 and Uganda 
on position 161 (see http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AUT.html, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD.html, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/RWA.html, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/UGA.html, 16/1/2012). 
2
 For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Sierra Leone and in Somalia 
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 The present study aims at finding elements necessary to re-establish and, where 
necessary, improve judicial systems that were in place prior to a conflict. It does not 
claim to offer a one-size-fits-all approach, neither for judicial systems that need to be 
rebuilt, nor for those that need to be established for the first time, as the conceptions of 
justice and judicial systems need to be adapted to a given social context and the most 
pressing requirements of the society. In particular, the study seeks to outline which 
challenges a judicial system is likely to face in a post-conflict situation and how these 
challenges could be addressed from within the government and from the point of view 
of providers of external, international support.  
 
Furthermore, the study concentrates on how judicial systems can contribute to the 
transition to a more peaceful and prosperous future. It also examines their importance in 
state-building exercises to establish whether the re-establishment of judicial systems 
should be given a more prominent role to trigger development and stability.   
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The methodology used for the present study will focus on a review of selected 
background literature and relevant case studies to determine which approaches can be 
used to re-establish certain elements of judicial systems. Most pertinent literature, in 
particular on state-building and post-conflict situations, is available in English, 
wherever sources are quoted in a different language and no official translation is 
available, translation is provided by the author. Legislation analyzed is to the greatest 
extent also available in English, either as official version as English is the official 
language of the state concerned (such as for Uganda and Rwanda) or as authorized 
official translation from the official language (such as for Austria).  
 
With particular regard to the two countries used as case studies throughout the 
present paper, Rwanda and Uganda, a review of relevant legislation concerning the 
judicial system will be carried out and the legislation will be compared to that of Austria 
as European counterpart with, in the case of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, a similar legal system. This is by no means intended as a hegemonistic 
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exercise, it should only facilitate the reader’s comparison of legal systems between the 
two continents.  
 
While the present study does not aim at creating any ranking between countries 
emerging from post-conflict situations, the methodology used will facilitate the 
comparison of different concepts and approaches used to rebuild judicial systems. 
Given the very limited data available, a sound quantitative analysis cannot be carried 
out. Therefore, the present study aims at qualitatively comparing those concepts and 
approaches in order to determine which steps are the most promising to take in 
establishing a functional judicial system which is in accordance with at least the basic 
requirements of human rights and civil liberties.  
 
Choosing which countries should be used as case studies has been a difficult 
decision. In the Great Lakes Region of East Africa, the neighbouring states of Rwanda 
and Uganda are similar in size and economic challenges and have both lived through 
violent periods, one even more than the other, some time ago. For choosing case 
studies, this is important as the results of post-conflict reconstruction are often not 
immediately visible, but become apparent only once time passes. This study does not 
aim at judging their political systems or civil liberties3, it concentrates only on the 
judicial system and the infrastructure needed to carry out trials and appeals.  
 
However, it is clear that both Rwanda and Uganda are, at the time of writing in 
2011, relatively stable states in the region as compared to the neighbouring Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) or the newest member state of the United Nations4, the 
Republic of South Sudan. While both of these states would also offer an extremely 
interesting opportunity for a case study, conflicts are too recent and the judicial system 
is too little developed and not sufficiently functional to allow for an analysis of which 
elements have been crucial in their establishment. Nevertheless, the DRC as both 
                                         
3
 For indicators of each country’s political status, see Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
comparative and historical data, which compiles measurements of political rights and civil liberties from 
1972 to 2011 (latest data available at the time of writing). For 2011, Austria is listed as free in relation to 
political rights and civil liberties, while Uganda is reported as partly free. Both the DRC and Rwanda are 
listed as not free. The chart is available under http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439, 
8/1/2011. 
4
 See http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml, 17/12/2011 
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Rwanda and Uganda’s next-door-neighbour in a post-conflict situation will be used on 
occasions as example to contrast developments in those two states.  
 
While in order to determine effective elements in re-establishing judicial 
systems, a certain amount of success in any state studied is necessary, it is important to 
bear in mind that, given the fact that each conflict and therefore also each post-conflict 
situation is different, the analysis could potentially reach different conclusions for other 
case studies. However, this does not counter the objectives of the study, as it aims to 
provide only the elements and tools that have proven successful in re-establishing 
judicial systems and not to furnish a complete solution to how to rebuild a judicial 
system. For each post-conflict situation, the tools and elements to be used from the kit 
available have to be chosen with great care and awareness to social and cultural contexts 
and expectations in order to develop a judicial system suitable for a particular state.  
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
The present study starts by describing functional and effective judicial systems 
and the elements of which they are constituted. It explains which basic structures need 
to be in place legally, politically and in terms of infrastructure for a judicial system to be 
able to reach a certain amount of fairness, functionality and effectiveness. It then 
proceeds to demonstrate the differences between transitional justice and judicial systems 
by explaining their different purposes and the possibilities of distinction between the 
two.  
 
While the present paper is focused on conventional judicial systems and not on 
transitional justice mechanisms, it is important to understand the link and the potential 
synergies between the two systems. Therefore, as examples of transitional justice 
mechanisms and their possibilities of cooperating with a conventional judicial system, 
the cooperation between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and national judicial 
systems will be examined. Furthermore, international tribunals5, special courts6, truth 
                                         
5
 E.g., the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
6
 E.g., the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
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commissions and alternative options and their links and connections to the conventional 
judicial system will be briefly discussed. 
 
The second part of the study focuses on post-conflict situations and their 
particular challenges to judicial systems. In particular, the different problems the 
judicial system often faces after a regime change or other dramatic change in 
government will be discussed. Furthermore, the different challenges posed by internal 
or external conflicts will be examined to determine whether they require different 
approaches in the re-establishment of a judicial system.  
 
The study continues to examine re-establishment of judicial systems in the 
context of state-building exercises and their importance in facilitating a state’s 
progression from a post-conflict situation to a more stable and peaceful future. 
Furthermore, the study discusses the international standards and norms7 that can be of 
use in deciding on how to rebuild or establish a judicial system. It then offers a series of 
recommendations for states and the international and donor community on which 
elements should be taken into account when approaching the re-establishment of a 
judicial system in a post-conflict situation. To conclude, an executive summary of the 
key findings of the study is presented.   
                                         
7
 E.g., the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners 
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2 Functioning judicial systems and their requirements 
 
Judicial systems play a far more important role in the daily life of a society as 
one would imagine at a first glance: Their primary task is to prosecute suspects and 
adjudicate perpetrators of crime to punish individuals. However, judicial systems also 
carry out tasks of specific and general crime prevention via deterrence, re-socialise and 
reintegrate offenders who have served their sentences and protect society from those 
that cannot be reintegrated. Thereby, they act as a safeguard to peace and stability in the 
society. These functions become crystal clear once a judicial system is non-existent or 
severely malfunctioning: If impunity reigns, the adherence to social and legal norms 
significantly decreases, leaving the population without protection from unlawful 
conduct by both the authorities and members of the society.  
 
 This is particularly evident with regards to the criminal justice sector, as it is the 
part of the judicial system that deals with the most imminent threats to life and security, 
most interventions in post-conflict judicial systems tend to focus on that sector.8 In 
addition, the verdicts for criminal justice offenders, such as being sentenced to 
imprisonment, are likely to have a higher impact on the civil liberties of the offenders 
and therefore require even more meticulous attention from and careful application by 
the judicial system.  
 
However, it is important not to be oblivious to the implications the decisions of civil 
justice can have in post-conflict societies: For instance, establishing ownership over 
property can be particularly challenging in post-conflict situations9, especially if no 
written records of property have ever existed or if such records have been destroyed 
during the conflict. Yet, in particular when internally displaced persons (IDPs) or 
refugees return after the conflict to find their homes or agricultural property occupied by 
someone else, establishing such ownership can be crucial to the security and peace in a 
society and to the prevention of renewing the conflict. This is especially pressing 
following ethnic conflicts: If the returnees find their homes occupied by members of 
                                         
8
 See OHCHR : Rule of Law Tools for Post-conflict States : Mapping the justice sector (2006), p. 8 
9
 See ibid, p. 13 
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their former rival ethnic group (which is often the case, one group advances to the 
territory of the other after the first group fled), land conflicts can quickly reignite ethnic 
conflicts and lead to a deterioration of the situation as a whole.  
 
 As such, it is important to re-establish and render functional all sectors of the 
judicial system as quickly as possible after a conflict. However, because of the human 
rights and security implications, the starting point for any such exercise is likely to be 
the criminal justice sector.  
 
2.1 Tasks of a functioning judicial system 
 
While the structure of the judicial system is unique in each post-conflict 
situation, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) identified a total of 42 institutions that form part of the post-conflict rule-of-
law sector.10 Out of these institutions, it selected three as being priorities for 
peacekeeping operations: the judiciary, the police and the prison service.11 Because of 
the implications these institutions have on human rights and their interdependence, 
these are also the priority institutions that any effort to re-establish a judicial system in a 
post-conflict country needs to focus on, in addition with an effort to reduce the potential 
role of the military in conducting policing tasks. As such, the present study will 
comprise all of them when discussing the re-establishment of a judicial system.  
 
The imminent question remaining is how to determine whether a judicial system 
is indeed a functioning one and, if not, how it can be rendered more efficient. Indicators 
that can be used to determine the quality and efficiency of a judicial system include, 
among others, the following:  
 
 Time limits to detention before a suspect is brought before a judge12 and 
their respect in practice 
 Average duration of a trial  
 Average time until a verdict is issued 
                                         
10
 See OHCHR : Rule of Law Tools for Post-conflict States, p. 5 
11
 See ibid, p. 5 f 
12
 See ibid, p. 2 
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 Average time until an appeal is heard 
 Average time a judge serves in his or her position 
 Average law education of judges, prosecutors and lawyers 
 Ratio of judges per population. 
 
Furthermore, OHCHR refers to the following benchmarks in assessing judicial and 
police systems:  
 
 Ethnic diversity of key staff 
 Racial diversity of key staff 
 Gender diversity of key staff 
 Financial resources dedicated to the judicial system (in percentage of the 
national budget) 
 Objective appointment and promotion criteria 
 Transparency in decision-making 
 Accountability and applicability of professional codes of ethics and 
protections from external interference13 
 
However, those indicators will often not be available in the immediate aftermath 
of a conflict, as trials have likely stalled or were not conducted according to human 
rights standards during the conflict. In addition, in many post-conflict situations, court 
files have gone missing or have been destroyed, which renders it impossible to trace 
individual cases to establish such individual indicators.  
 
Therefore, it is often necessary to look either at secondary data compiled before 
or during the conflict by external sources (such as the OHCHR in its reports, any 
information potentially made available by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) etc.) or to proceed with an assessment despite the lack of the aforementioned 
indicators.  
 
                                         
13
 See OHCHR : Rule of Law Tools for Post-conflict States, p. 32 
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However, it might be possible to compile data concerning the indicators 
established by OHCHR: As will be discussed below, a stock-taking exercise to assess 
the judicial system in place will need to be carried out in most post-conflict situations. 
This exercise can serve as an opportunity to collect such information, in particular with 
regards to the diversity and education of staff, the existence of transparent mechanisms 
for appointment and promotion and the application of professional codes of ethics. 
While this might not be sufficient to guarantee a detailed insight into the judicial 
system, it will help determine strengths and weaknesses of a judicial system and serve 
as a starting point to reviewing it in order to ensure its independence, functioning and 
efficiency. 
 
The main task of a judicial system is to prosecute, try and adjudicate offenders. 
However, the consequences of its actions are by far more important than the straight-
forward taking of judicial decisions: In the criminal justice sector, punishments are 
imposed to prevent further crimes from being committed. On an individual level, they 
are meant to deter the offender from committing another crime. In addition, by being 
shown that offenders are punished, the general public is deterred from the commission 
of crimes. By taking these preventive measures, the criminal justice system contributes 
to the re-establishment and to the keeping of peace within a society. Furthermore, it 
extracts offenders that cannot be reintegrated from society, thereby protecting the 
general public from dangers by these convicted offenders. In the civil sector, the judicial 
system contributes to the establishment and keeping of peace by settling disputes and 
preventing e.g. looting through property laws and exploitation through labour laws.  
 
Through these actions, the judicial system protects the population from attacks 
on life and freedom as well as from extortion and exploitation. However, parts of the 
judicial system can also play another role: Depending on the legal system and the courts 
in place, a court, in particular the highest ranks of courts, such as supreme courts, can 
also be seen as political institutions. Dahl describes the role of the Supreme Court of the 
United States as a legal, but also as a political institution.14 He explains the importance 
of the court, and therefore the judicial system, in a democracy by outlining that it serves 
                                         
14
 See Dahl, Robert A.: Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a national policy-maker. 
In: Epstein, Lee (ed.): Courts and Judges (1958), p. 485 
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as protection mechanism for minorities against tyranny by majorities.15 As such, in a 
democracy, where decisions are taken by the majority of the population, the judicial 
system has the additional function of preventing abuse of power by the majority towards 
the minority.  
 
However, as the judicial system only intervenes once an infraction of rights has 
occurred or has been claimed, one might regard this as a little effective way of 
protecting minority rights. While it holds true that the judicial system will always be 
one step behind in protecting minority rights, it cannot be overlooked that judicial 
decisions will serve as precedents for the future, and as such, once an initial case has 
been completed and the precedent been established, it also serves as deterrent to other 
potential infractions.  
 
Furthermore, Dahl describes the role of the Supreme Court as policy-making 
institution and points out that it forms part of the dominant national political alliances.16 
While this will hold true for many post-conflict states as well, it is important to examine 
the appointment process for judges to the Supreme Court in order to understand to 
which extent their appoint is a political decision: If it is e.g. the president appointing the 
judges to the Supreme Court, as it is the case in the United States17, the decision is 
likely to be a very political one, as the president might and is likely to choose a 
candidate with similar political views to his or her own. If the decision on the 
candidates is taken by someone else or if the president is bound to suggestions made by 
others, the appointment process needs to be reviewed closely in order to determine 
political influence.18 
                                         
15
 See Dahl, Robert A.: Decision-making in a Democracy, p. 488 
16
 See ibid, p. 499 
17
 See ibid, p. 491 
18
 In Austria, the judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the president of the republic. 
However, the appointments have to be made according to suggestions made by the federal government, 
the National Council and the Federal Council (the two chambers of the Austrian parliament). The 
government has the right to suggest the president, the vice-president, 6 judges and 3 substitutional judges, 
the National Council suggests 3 judges and 2 substitutional judges, while the Federal Council suggests 3 
judges and 1 substitutional judge, according to Art 147 Abs 2 of the Austrian Constitution. See 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Dokumentnummer=NOR40094816&
ResultFunctionToken=c6deae98-b036-49c5-80f6-
036dc4a5ede1&Position=1&Kundmachungsorgan=&Index=&Titel=&Gesetzesnummer=&VonArtikel=
&BisArtikel=&VonParagraf=&BisParagraf=&VonAnlage=&BisAnlage=&Typ=&Kundmachungsnumm
er=&Unterzeichnungsdatum=&FassungVom=15.01.2012&NormabschnittnummerKombination=Und&I
mRisSeit=Undefined&ResultPageSize=100&Suchworte=ernennung+richter, 15/1/2012. 
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In addition, the role of the Supreme Court needs to be reviewed within the legal 
system of any post-conflict state. Court decisions can be legally binding on different 
levels, depending on whether a country adheres to the civil law or to the common law 
system.  
 
2.2 The Rwandan judicial system 
 
During colonialism, the Germans and Belgians introduced legal systems similar 
to their own civil law legal systems.19 This includes the establishment of a judicial 
system similar to the ones found in civil law countries. After independence, rather than 
establishing an entirely new legal system, Rwanda kept the majority of this legislation 
in place, which explains why the current system is similar to the German and Belgian 
civil law systems.20 However, customary law has also kept a certain influence.21 As a 
general tendency, it can be stated that the Rwandan legal system is currently undergoing 
a transition to becoming a merged system between common and civil law.22  
 
This change is in line with the general development in the political sphere of the 
country, in particular, with Rwanda joining the Commonwealth in November 200923 
and with the adoption of English as an official language in 1994 and the ongoing move 
to have English replace French as language of instruction at schools: While the official 
reasons given for this change are economic ones, it is often interpreted as a move away 
from France following the 1994 genocide and as an accommodation to the English-
speaking political elite in the country.24 
 
                                         
19
 See http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Rwanda.htm#_The_Judiciary, 16/12/2012 
20
 See ibid, 16/12/2012 
21
 See ibid, 16/12/2012 
22
 See ibid, 16/12/2012 
23
 See http://www.thecommonwealth.org/YearbookHomeInternal/217016/, 16/12/2012 
24
 See http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97245421, 16/12/2012 
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The basic principles concerning the judiciary in Rwanda are enshrined in Chapter 
5 of its constitution of 4 June 2003.25 As such, article 140 of the constitution specifies 
that:  
The judiciary is independent and separate from the legislative and executive 
branches of government. It enjoys financial and administrative autonomy.  
Justice is rendered in the name of the people and nobody may be a judge in 
his or her own cause.26  
 Furthermore, the same article states that judicial decisions are binding on all 
concerned parties independent of whether they are public authorities or individuals and 
that such decisions shall not be challenged through any other ways or procedures than 
those determined by law.27 Through these principles, Rwanda sets out the basics for a 
modern, independent judicial system.  
 
Rwanda’s judicial system has undergone a series of changes and readjustments 
since the 1994 genocide. However, major changes did not take place until 2003, when 
the Supreme Court was restructured.28 In 2006, Organic Law N014/2006 of 22 March 
2006 modified the court structure by replacing Province Tribunals by High Instance 
Tribunals.29 In addition, the Organic Law reduced the number of District Tribunals from 
106 to 6030, now called Primary Courts31. 
 
The hierarchy of the ordinary court system consists of the Supreme Court, the 
High Court and its Chambers, the Intermediate Courts and the Primary Courts.32 
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Furthermore, there is a system of specialized courts, comprising the Commercial 
Courts, the Traditional Jurisdictions Gacaca, the Military Court and the Military 
Tribunal.33 The Gacaca courts as an alternative option of transitional justice 
mechanisms will be discussed in further detail in section 3.3.1 below. 
 
A 1999 report34 by the United Nations Special Representative for Human Rights 
in Rwanda, Michel Moussalli, to the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations resumes the situation of the judicial system in Rwanda and points out several 
positive and negative developments: On the judicial system, Moussalli states that its 
functioning following the genocide continues to pose a major challenge, but also 
specifies that progress has been made.35 He emphasizes the fact that the accused are 
now most often assisted by an advocate, following a change in the behaviour of 
Rwandan lawyers that now accept to represent them (following an intervention and 
funding received from Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF)).36  
 
Moussalli however deplores the lack of training, stating that only 15 out of 800, 
or 2 per cent, of magistrates have a law degree while most others only underwent three 
to six months training, and reports that the lack of infrastructure, such as transport to 
and from courts, still causes problems within the judiciary.37 Furthermore, he states that 
the low salary level is often seen as an invitation to corruption.38 On a particularly 
interesting note, Moussalli says that any interference in the independence of the 
judiciary, especially from administrative organs, should be resisted, thereby indicating 
that such interference occurs within the judicial system.39 With regards to the conditions 
of detention, Moussalli deplores the overcrowding in detention facilities and the 
sanitary conditions therein which allow for the easy spread of diseases.40 While the 
situation seems to have improved with the establishment of the Gacaca courts, prison 
conditions and fair trials remain an important issue in Rwanda. 
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36
 See ibid, section E, 16/1/2012 
37
 See ibid, section E, 16/1/2012 
38
 See ibid, section E, 16/1/2012 
39
 See ibid, section E, 16/1/2012 
40
 See ibid, section D, 16/1/2012 
Iustitia post bellum – Re-establishing judicial systems in post-conflict situations 
 
23 
 
 
In 2004, Rwanda established a law relating to the Code of Ethics for the 
Judiciary, setting out legal obligations for judges to inter alia respect the principle of 
judicial independence.41 However, this law also poses problems in terms of restricting 
the political rights of judges, as it states in its article 21 that: 
 
“A carrier [career, note by the author] judge is prohibited from 
joining political parties. He or she is not supposed to act as a member of 
any political party, or give speech in it, or give support to any political 
candidate or mobilise funds or give support to a candidate, a political 
organisation or political cause. He or she is however, permited to vote like 
any other citizen but is not allowed to join political gatherings except 
those which invite the general population of his residence.”42 
 
While it is important that judges are politically independent and refrain from 
exposing suspects to preferential or degrading treatment depending on their and the 
suspects’ political opinions, it is problematic to render simple party membership of or 
personal donations to a political party by a judge illegal as it might be an infraction on 
the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association as set forth in articles 19 
and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights43, to which Rwanda is 
a party44. 
 
In a recent report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review to the 
Human Rights Council of the United Nations in 2011, Rwanda pointed to its National 
Commission for Human Rights, which had been established and fulfilled the Paris 
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Principles.45 In addition, and with particular regards to the judicial system, the Rwandan 
delegation stated that Rwanda had put in place Access to Justice Bureaux in all 30 
districts which aim to provide free legal-aid services to vulnerable people.46 
Furthermore, it defended the system of Gacaca courts and stated that it had proven to 
work well for Rwanda.47 
 
However, Vandeginste points out that Rwanda has not yet successfully 
conducted a political transition process to ensure power sharing, inclusiveness, and 
better governance.48 In addition, he points out that several leading figures, nearly all 
Hutu, have been forced to leave inter alia the judicial system in the years following 
1994 (such as the Hutu president of the Cour de Cassation, Augustin Cyiza, who 
resigned under pressure in 1998, and the Hutu Minister of Justice, Faustin Nteziryayo, 
who resigned and fled in January 1999).49 
 
2.3 The Ugandan judicial system 
 
Similar to the situation in Rwanda, where the legal system resembles the ones of 
the German and Belgian colonialists, the Ugandan legal system was created based on 
the British legal system and is therefore a common law system, in which influences of 
customary law exist50. Chapter Eight of the Ugandan constitution of 1995 regulates the 
judiciary.51 Uganda provides for the principle of the independence of the judiciary in 
article 128 of the constitution, stating that: 
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(1) The courts shall be independent and shall not be subject to the control 
or direction of any person or authority. 
2) A person exercising judicial power will not be legally 
responsible for any act or omission in the exercise of that power.52 
 
While the first paragraph is clearly referring to the independence of the 
judiciary, the second paragraph is questionable as it could imply that, even if a judge 
knowingly abuses his power, he or she will not be held legally responsible, which 
would clearly be against the rule of law.  
 
As set forth in article 129 of the constitution, Uganda’s judicial system consists 
of a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeal, a High Court and lower courts as established by 
law by the Parliament.53 Another article of the constitution which is important to the 
independence of the judiciary is article 144 concerning the removal from office of a 
judicial officer: While the age limits are common in many legal systems, article 144 
para. 2 states that:  
 
A judicial officer may be removed from office only for— 
(a) inability to perform the functions of his or her office arising 
from poor health of body or mind; 
(b) misbehaviour or misconduct; or 
(c) incompe[n]tence.54 
 
However, neither the procedure to remove a judicial officer nor the commission 
or person permitted to do so is specified in the constitution, thereby leaving a legitimacy 
gap which might be used to dispose of politically unwanted judicial officers.  
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During Idi Amin’s rule, a Commission for Law Reform had been established in 
the Ministry of Justice.55 However, this Commission lacked financial resources and was 
ineffective.56 Following the entry into power of Museveni’s NRM government, which 
stated as one of its objectives restoring the rule of law, revived the Commission and 
instated a High Court Justice as Commissioner in 1986.57 Furthermore, the Commission 
for Law Revision, tasked with reviewing the legal structure and clearing obsolete laws 
and adding necessary amendments, was revived.58 
 
Uganda chose to opt for a truth commission to come to terms with the crimes 
committed since its independence. This truth commission will be discussed in further 
detail in section 3.3.2 below.  
 
2.4 Comparison of indicators concerning the judicial systems 
 
With regards to the indicators mentioned above, the time limits to detention 
before a suspect is brought before a judge in Rwanda are set forth in article 33 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure:  
 
[…] 
If a person is caught red-handed or taken to be committing an offence, any 
person, in the absence of a judicial police officer, can arrest such an 
offender and immediately take him or her to the nearest Judicial Police 
Officer.  
A Judicial Police Officer who receives the person caught red-handed must 
complete his or her criminal case file within forty-eight (48) hours and send 
it to a competent public prosecutor, who, in turn, if necessary, institutes a 
suit within forty-eight (48) hours in a competent court.  
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For the purposes of investigation, the Prosecution Service can extend such a 
period to not more that twenty-four (24) hours.  
The seazed [seized, note by the author] Court must examine the case within 
fifteen (15) days from the reception of the case.59  
The possibility of private persons arresting offenders that have been caught red-
handed as stated in the first phrase above is common to many legal systems. In Austria, 
this is set forth in § 80 StPO, which states that, inter alia, in such a case, a private person 
can arrest such an offender, but has to immediately inform the next organ of public 
order (such as a policeman or other).60 However, the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure states in the same article that the arrest is only allowed to happen in a way 
that is concurrent with the offences committed61, thereby protecting the offender from 
revenge or mob attacks from the general population, a protection clause which cannot 
be found in Rwandan law. 
 
Uganda also allows the arrest of offenders or suspected offenders by private 
persons as set forth in articles 15 and 16 of the Ugandan Code of Criminal Procedure.62 
In article 16, Uganda determines that persons arrested in such a way should be turned 
over to police officers without unnecessary delay, or, in the absence of a police officer, 
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be taken to the nearest police station.63 However, Ugandan law also does not foresee the 
protection of offenders from their private arresters.  
 
Rwandan law provides for a maximum period of 48 hours of detention before a 
case is presented to the prosecutor and another 48 hours before the prosecutors institutes 
a suit in court, therefore giving a total period of maximum four days before a court is 
concerned with a detainee’s case (which can be prolonged for another day for purposes 
of investigation). Subsequently, within 15 days, the court has to examine the case, 
thereby allowing for a maximum period of 20 days between the arrest of an offender 
caught red-handed and the court examination of the case.  
 
Given the small size of the Rwandan territory and the infrastructure which has 
by now improved to be very good as compared to other countries in the region (in 
particular as compared to the DRC with its woeful standard of roads), transportation 
should not cause problems in meeting such deadlines established by law.  
 
In Austria, a court has to decide within 48 hours after the reception of the 
detainee on whether a detainee should be put into pre-trial custody or whether he or she 
should be released.64   
 
Uganda states that suspected offenders (with the exception of suspects detained 
for murder, treason or rape) should be brought before an appropriate magistrate’s court 
within 24 hours after his or her detention.65 If it does not appear practicable to bring the 
person before an appropriate court within 24 hours, the police is supposed to start an 
inquiry and release the suspect on bond where possible.66 Should it not be possible to 
release the suspect on bond, he or she is to be brought before a magistrate’s court as 
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soon as possible.67 In addition, the officers in charge of police stations are required to 
report any arrests of persons without warrants to the nearest magistrate within 24 
hours.68 
 
While, at a first glance, Uganda is providing for a clear and limited time-frame 
of 24 hours until a case is brought before a court, the remainder of the provision is 
increasingly indecisive, in particular when stating that, if it is not possible to release a 
suspect on bond, he or she should be brought before court as soon as possible, as this 
provision might lead to prolonged detention without judiciary oversight. However, and 
again given the relatively good infrastructure in most of Uganda, especially in Kampala 
and its surroundings, transportation of suspects to courts should not pose a problem. 
 
Unfortunately, reliable data on real transfer times from the time of arrest to the 
time a court is concerned with a case is not publicly available for Rwanda or Uganda, 
thereby limiting the analysis above to an abstract legal analysis. 
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3 Transitional justice and the judicial system 
 
3.1 Different approaches and tasks 
 
By definition, post-conflict societies have faced traumatizing amounts of 
violence in their communities. To emerge from a post-conflict situation, apart from 
rebuilding the physical damage that might have been done, reconciliation is one of the 
most pressing goals to ensure that the cycle of violence can be interrupted.69 However, 
as Rigby explains, a society trying to come to terms with its difficult past can be 
compared to the Western approach of helping victims deal with post-traumatic stress 
disorder: He suggests that for a post-conflict society to be able to progress and create 
new foundations, it is important assure a secure environment for victims to tell their 
story.70 However, such a secure environment is often non-existent in post-conflict 
societies, and victims continue to be afraid of their persecutors. Whereas in a modern 
state with functioning institutions, any crimes that have been committed would be 
adjudicated by the domestic judicial system, in many post-conflict situations, the 
number of perpetrators and the extent of their crimes is too serious for the domestic, 
often non-existent or seriously challenged judicial system to deal with.  
 
This leaves decision-makers at both the national and the international level in a 
difficult situation, as they need to establish an exit-strategy for the post-conflict state. 
As Rigby explains, two major strategies exist: firstly, amnesia, or subordinating 
everything to the peaceful transition to democratic rule, and secondly, the pursuit of 
justice, or the attempt to prosecute those guilty of perpetrating human rights abuses.71 
The first option, amnesia, might work on a short-term72, but comes with the great 
handicap of leaving the perpetrators unpunished. Rigby continues to explain that the 
pursuit of justice, as it was first done with the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials after World 
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War II73, even though it is often criticised for being so-called victor’s justice, helps 
prevent revenge and self-help justice and individualizes guilt, which is an important 
factor in avoiding to blame an entire society or an entire part of it for atrocities 
committed.74 As the approach of pursuing justice has by far more consequences for the 
re-establishment of judicial systems in post-conflict situations, the present paper does 
not discuss the approach of collective amnesia to permit a transition to a peaceful 
society.   
 
If the decision to prosecute the perpetrators is taken, additional mechanisms to 
address the crimes perpetrated during a conflict can be needed. Transitional justice aims 
at providing these additional mechanisms without replacing the domestic judicial 
system or the traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution which are in place. While 
the present study is focusing on the reestablishment of the judicial system to adjudicate 
offences not or not only related to the conflict experienced by any particular state and 
therefore does not intend to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of particular 
transitional justice mechanisms in detail, it is important to examine the links between 
transitional justice and ordinary judicial systems to fully appreciate their potential 
synergies as well as the potential pitfalls that their coexistence in any given context 
might cause.  
 
Mobekk defines transitional justice mechanisms as such:  
 
Transitional justice mechanisms are created to deal with crimes that 
were committed during a conflict period, at a stage where the society 
is at the cusp of transition from a society of conflict to one of 
democracy and peace.75 
 
Similarly, a report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2004 
defines transitional justice as comprising processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to 
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ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.76 The report further 
states that these mechanisms may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, 
with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual 
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a 
combination thereof.77 
 
There is a vast array of different mechanisms and approaches to transitional 
justice. The best-known and most commonly used mechanisms can be separated into 
judicial and alternative mechanisms, as the definition used by the Secretary-General 
above indicates: Judicial mechanisms include the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
international tribunals and special courts as well as the use of local courts, whereas 
alternative mechanisms include the establishment of truth commissions and the use of 
traditional methods of justice rooted in the society concerned.78  
 
However, given the multitude of different mechanisms available, how should 
one decide on which mechanism is the right one to use in a specific situation? As Rigby 
explains, trials can be instrumentalized, might serve as morality plays and could, in 
certain situations, not be the best way of dealing with the subtleties of the past.79 He 
suggests that a truth commission might, in certain circumstances, be the better choice of 
addressing past misdeeds, in particular, if the new regime lacks either the will or the 
means to prosecute the perpetrators of crime.80 
 
3.2 The international institutions of justice and national judicial systems 
 
 One of the most pressing issues is the coordination between the existing or 
specifically set up institutions of justice such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
international criminal tribunals or special courts, and the respective national judicial 
system in place or being established in a post-conflict country. As any potential crimes 
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are likely to have been committed either by or against nationals of the post-conflict 
country or on the territory of the post-conflict country, that country will usually have 
jurisdiction over these crimes based on the principles of either active or passive 
personality or on the principle of territoriality. However, as its judicial system might not 
be in a position to cope with the amount of trials that would need to be held, or it might 
not be wise to try certain high-profile suspects in the country in order to avoid 
disturbances of the public order or even a recurrence of the conflict, certain trials might 
have to be held elsewhere and under another jurisdiction.  
 
In the subsequent paragraphs, certain institutions of international justice will be 
discussed; however, the listing below is by no means exhaustive. The paper will present 
only the most global institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, and other 
institutions of particular relevance to the states studied in more detail, such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In addition, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone will be presented as it represents a hybrid court, a different transitional justice 
mechanism that could also be used as a model for other post-conflict states and comes 
with particular challenges and opportunities with regard to the cooperation with national 
judicial systems.  
 
3.2.1 The International Criminal Court 
 
 The International Criminal Court with its seat in The Hague was established by 
the Rome Statute81 of 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002.82 To date, 
the Rome Statute has 120 States parties, among them Austria, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, and Uganda, while Rwanda has neither ratified the treaty nor acceded to 
it.83 
 
 In comparing the ICC with other institutions of transitional justice, it becomes 
obvious that the ICC has an outstanding position: It is the only permanent institution set 
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up to deal with issues addressed by transitional justice mechanisms, while other 
mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or Special Courts are 
Ad-hoc mechanisms specifically set up to deal with crimes committed in a certain 
territory in a certain period of time. Truth commissions and other instruments of 
transitional justice follow the same approach and are established to respond to clearly 
defined conflicts. In the international system, the ICC is the only stand-by institution of 
transitional justice, which makes it clear that temporality cannot be a defining factor for 
the distinction between a judicial system and a transitional justice mechanism.   
 
 The most important principle for the cooperation between the ICC and national 
judicial systems is the principle of complementarity as defined in article 1 of the Rome 
Statute, which states that the jurisdiction of the ICC shall be complementary to that of 
national criminal jurisdictions.84 The complementarity in the Rome Statute is two-fold: 
The ICC is to try only the most serious crimes (see article 585) and the most high-profile 
suspects.  
 
This leaves the task of dealing with the majority of suspects to the national 
criminal jurisdiction, but should ensure that high-profile suspects of the most serious 
crimes are tried at the ICC to ensure that they do not benefit from impunity because of 
their high standing in their respective communities, but also that they receive a fair and 
unbiased trial that is not politically motivated. At the same time, this also explains that, 
since the ICC is to deal only with crimes of this extent, it is likely to be involved in the 
administration of transitional justice following a conflict in the territory of one of the 
States parties to the Rome Statute. However, it is important to note that the involvement 
of the ICC does not preclude other options of transitional justice; a truth commission or 
other specific transitional justice mechanisms for suspects not to be tried by the ICC 
could nevertheless be established.   
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 In practice, the cooperation between the national judicial system and the ICC 
needs to be extremely tight: Certain evidence will have to be collected by the national 
criminal justice system to be subsequently presented to the ICC, suspects need to be 
arrested by national law enforcement officials and their detention, at least at the initial 
stage of an investigation before transfer to The Hague can be arranged, needs to be 
within the national detention system.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
3.2.2 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
 Similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
established in 199386, the United Nations Security Council established an International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)87 through its resolution 955 of 8 November 
199488. The ICTR was established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and 
upon the request of the government of Rwanda89 and has taken its seat in Arusha, 
United Republic of Tanzania, in accordance with Security Council resolution 97790. 
Prosecutions at the ICTR started in January 199791, almost 3 years after the beginning 
of the genocide in April 199492.  
 
 The ICTR was established by a Security Council resolution as a subsidiary organ 
of the Security Council according to article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations93. 
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Therefore, the statute of the ICTR is not a statute to be separately signed by the states 
that wish to participate, but it is annexed to Security Council resolution 95594 and 
therefore binding for all UN member states95. Interestingly, the ICTR and its “sister 
tribunal”, the ICTY, were the first international criminal tribunals to be established 
since the military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, at which individuals were held 
personally responsible for the crimes they committed during World War II, even if they 
were committed in obedience to superior orders or in the service of the state.96 Rigby 
explains this by the fact that the intervention of the international community in the 
prosecution of the perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity was caused by 
a sense of shame and guilt by the major powers which felt that they had not done all 
they might have to prevent the occurrences of war crimes.97   
 
The ICTR’s jurisdiction is clearly defined in the statute as limited to crimes 
committed during the period 1 January to 31 December 199498, the year in which the 
genocide in Rwanda took place. Furthermore, the territorial jurisdiction is limited in so 
far as the tribunal only has jurisdictions over crimes committed in Rwanda or by 
Rwandans in its neighbouring states99. Article 5 limits the personal jurisdiction to 
natural person, thereby excluding corporate bodies or organizations.100 However, the 
most interesting limitation of the ICTR’s jurisdiction is the material limitation: articles 
2, 3 and 4 of the ICTR’s statute determine genocide, crimes against humanity and 
certain violations common to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol II 
(such as e.g. the taking of hostages and pillage).101 
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 As with all transitional justice mechanisms, the most interesting question for the 
present paper is that of the coexistence of the ICTR and national judicial systems. The 
ICTR’s statute is quite clear on the cooperation and hierarchy of the tribunal and 
national judicial systems, in particular in article 8:  
 
Article 8 
Concurrent jurisdiction 
 
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall 
have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations 
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 
1994 and 31 December 1994. 
2. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have primacy over the 
national courts of all States. At any stage of the procedure, the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national 
courts to defer to its competence in accordance with the present 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda.102 
  
This provision is crucial for the cooperation with a national judicial system, as it 
defines the ICTR’s primacy over national courts of all states, not only over Rwandese 
courts. Even if a national court has already started trying a suspect, the ICTR can 
request them to defer their competence, something which is innovative as in most legal 
systems, once a trial has started and an accusation has become legally binding (even in 
front of a court that would not be geographically competent for the particular case), that 
court becomes competent and no other court is permitted to initiate proceedings103. As 
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Gold points out, this principle has not been used in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.104 
 
Article 9105 sets forth one of the main principles for cooperating courts within 
the rule of law, “non bis in idem”, which states that no one shall be tried twice for the 
same offence. Article 9, para. 1, establishes that a trial by the ICTR excludes trial by 
national courts for the same offence, while para. 2 establishes that a person who has 
already been tried by a national court can only be tried by the ICTR under special 
circumstances, such as if his/her crime was characterized as an ordinary crime by the 
national court, if the national court’s proceedings were not impartial or independent or if 
the case was not diligently prosecuted.106 
 
As the ICTR’s statute is setting up a transitional justice mechanism, it does not 
address questions of ordinary, everyday criminality or petty crimes committed in 1994, 
which means that the Tribunal is not competent to try suspects for these crimes. This 
leaves the responsibility for such criminality within the Rwandese criminal justice 
system, which was understandably shattered by the end of the genocide.  
 
It is interesting to note that both the ICC’s107 and the ICTR’s108 statute use the 
definition of genocide as established in article II109 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter, the Genocide 
Convention), which was adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1948110. 
With regard to the countries specifically taken into account for the present paper, 
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Austria, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda are parties to the Genocide Convention, while 
Sierra Leone is not.111 
 
3.2.3 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
 Different from the ICC and the ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) was set up by an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone on 16 January 2002.112 This excludes the participation of other states from 
the beginning, as they are not parties to the agreement (as it is the case for the Rome 
Statute establishing the ICC) or not obliged to cooperate with the court through a 
Security Council resolution, as it is the case for the ICTR.  
 
In addition, and due to its bilateral status between the government of Sierra 
Leone and the United Nations, the statute does not foresee any articles on mutual legal 
assistance or extradition, which might prove difficult in cases in which suspects have 
fled the country. In these cases, the SCSL would have to draw upon bilateral or 
multilateral conventions to which Sierra Leone and the state in which the alleged 
offender is present are parties. Unfortunately, this might greatly delay prosecution and 
might enable some offenders to avoid trial if they have fled to countries which are not 
parties to any conventions permitting mutual legal assistance or extradition to Sierra 
Leone for the purpose of prosecuting and trying a suspect at the Special Court.  
 
Article 1, para. 1, of the agreement provides details on the establishment of the 
court:  
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Article 1 
Establishment of the Special Court 
 
1. There is hereby established a Special Court for Sierra Leone to 
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law 
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.113 
 
Article 1, para. 1, establishes that the SCSL is to prosecute persons for serious 
violations of both international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law, thereby 
allowing the court to prosecute certain crimes under the national law of Sierra Leone114, 
something that neither the ICC nor the ICTR can do. Article 2 on the composition of the 
SCSL and the appointment of judges indicates that some judges are to be appointed be 
the Secretary-General, while others will be nominated by the government of Sierra 
Leone.115 This indicates a further difference between the Special Court and the 
transitional justice mechanisms discussed above. As Bagamwabo points out, this mix of 
jurisdiction and composition characterizes the SCSL as a so-called hybrid court.116 
 
As the Special Court has jurisdiction over serious violations of Sierra Leonean 
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, it is 
particularly important to examine the cooperation of the SCSL with the national judicial 
system. To this end, the statute of the Special Court is following a two-tiered approach: 
Firstly, it includes an article on concurrent jurisdiction (article 8), which is extremely 
similar to the article governing concurrent jurisdiction in the statute of the ICTR. Article 
8 states that the SCSL and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction, but that the 
SCSL shall have primacy over the national courts and can formally request the deferral 
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of competence by a national court at any stage of the procedure.117  Secondly, to avoid 
confusion as to which crimes under Sierra Leonean law can be prosecuted by the SCSL; 
the statute provides an exhaustive list of crimes under Sierra Leonean law in its article 5 
that the SCSL shall have the power to prosecute:118  
 
Article 5 
Crimes under Sierra Leonean law 
 
The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who have 
committed the following crimes under Sierra Leonean law: 
a. Offences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Cap. 31): 
i. Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary to section 6; 
ii. Abusing a girl between 13 and 14 years of age, contrary to 
section 7; 
iii.Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, contrary to section 
12. 
b. Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the 
Malicious Damage Act, 1861: 
i. Setting fire to dwelling - houses, any person being therein, 
contrary to section 2; 
ii. Setting fire to public buildings, contrary to sections 5 and 6; 
iii.Setting fire to other buildings, contrary to section 6.119 
 
In line with the particular nature of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone, the 
statute of the SCSL singles out crimes of child abuse, property destruction and arson as 
the serious violations of Sierra Leonean law to be prosecuted by the Special Court. This 
demonstrates that, even though the hybrid court has the power to prosecute certain 
crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law, it is, true to its nature as transitional 
justice mechanism, not dealing with ordinary criminality either, leaving those trials 
again to the national judicial system.  
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3.3 Truth commissions and alternative options 
 
 Rigby points out that truth commissions are often adopted by regimes that lack 
the will or the means to prosecute the perpetrators of political crime, or in cases in 
which the policy of forgiving and forgetting is not viable because of the depth of 
division and the level of bitterness in the society concerned.120 He then continues to 
provide an overview over the conditions generally associated with such a situation by 
stating that a truth commission might be the best way to progress if 
 
1) the number of those complicit in past evils is such that, should they be 
prosecuted, there would not be a basis for future reconciliation 
2) a significant proportion of those who would be targeted by any purge are 
from one particular ethnic group or community, as a purge in these 
conditions might provide the basis for future social and political division 
3) the new regime is not confident that it is able to carry out a purge.121 
 
Rigby further explains that such conditions are likely to prevail if the new 
regime has come to power through some negotiated process which involved either the 
likely targets of a potential purge and/or their patrons rather than through a victory over 
the previous regime.122  
 
Rwanda and Uganda both resorted to traditional or alternative mechanisms to 
address crimes committed during the conflicts. While Rwanda adapted the traditional 
mechanism of the so-called Gacaca courts to deal with certain crimes committed during 
the genocide in 1994, Uganda established two separate truth commissions to investigate 
crimes. For the purposes of this study, only the second truth commission, the 
Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights established in 1986123, will be 
examined, while the first commission, the Commission of Inquiry into the 
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Disappearance of people in Uganda, established in 1974124, will not be discussed in 
further detail.  
 
3.3.1 Rwanda: The Gacaca courts 
 
As Ingelaere points out, a Western-style legal system was established in Rwanda 
during the colonial period, while the Gacaca courts as traditional mechanisms for 
conflict resolution at the local level continued to exist.125 For the judicial system, the 
change was drastic, as the new legal system brought along the introduction of written 
law and a new court system that was declared hierarchically superior in view of the 
traditional institutions in place.126 The introduction of written law, which is an absolute 
necessity in civil and common law systems, poses particular challenges: Laws need to 
be publicized and disseminated to become effective, they need to be known and 
understood by the population and the legal professionals, a task which becomes more 
complicated the higher the illiteracy rate in a country is127.  
 
The consequences of the 1994 genocide on the judicial system were devastating: 
judges had been killed or forced to flee the country, by the time the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) took over power on 4 July 1994128, the ordinary (meaning, Western-style ) 
justice system was virtually non-existent.129 Given the fact that there were 
extraordinarily high numbers of persons suspected to have participated in the genocide 
killings present in the country, this was particularly problematic as they could not be 
tried as it usually would have been the case without a judicial system in place. However, 
even as the judicial system started to work again, it became quickly overloaded with 
prosecuting the genocide suspects130 (in 1999, five years after the end of the genocide, 
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approximately 130.000 persons were still imprisoned for offences related to the 
genocide131). 
 
Therefore, and given the fact that prosecutions at the ICTR did not start until 
1997 (as outlined above), Rwanda had to resort to additional mechanisms in order to 
address the crimes committed during the genocide. As explained above, traditional 
justice in pre-colonial Rwanda was based on Gacaca courts established in the 
communities. While they had never ceased to exist during the colonization, the newly 
introduced Western-style legal system had taken primordial responsibility for judicial 
decisions in that time (see above). Nevertheless, following the breakdown of the judicial 
system in the aftermath of the genocide, the use and establishing of Gacaca courts was 
encouraged to address minor disputes within the population.132  
 
However, citing a 1996 UNHCHR report on the Gacaca courts, Ingelaere states 
that, in the initial years after the genocide, it was an absolute taboo to talk about killings 
during the Gacaca sessions.133 
 
When it became clear that the new judicial system could not cope with the vast 
number of trials it would have to conduct134, Gacaca courts135 were rethought and 
remodelled to deal also with certain crimes committed during the genocide (contrary to 
the jurisdiction of the ICTR, Gacaca courts have a temporal jurisdiction to try those 
crimes against humanity and genocide committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 
December 1994, thus encompassing a far broader timeline.)136 Similar to the standard 
procedure used in truth commissions, the defendants must give as much detail as 
possible and apologize in public (all Gacaca sessions are mandatory to attend for all 
adults in a community).137  
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Since their reinvention, Gacaca courts have become the most important 
instrument of transitional justice in Rwanda.138 The cooperation between Gacaca courts 
and Western-style courts is similar to the one between international courts or tribunals 
and national courts: The most high-profile suspects, in the case of Rwanda the persons 
who occupied positions of leadership, and, interestingly, rapists, are to be tried by the 
ordinary court system, while all other suspects are to be tried by a Gacaca court.139  
 
Of the 818.564 persons to be tried for genocide related crimes, approximately 
one tenth, or 80.000 people, are placed in this first category of high-profile suspects to 
be tried by the classical court system.140 The scope of the trials to be undertaken and 
therefore its toll on the judicial system is enormous, in particular when comparing the 
number of high-profile suspects to the Rwandan population, totalling at approximately 
11.3 million in 2011.141 
 
Contrary to the judges in a classic judicial system, Gacaca judges do not require 
legal education or training, but are only required to be persons of integrity; however, 
they did receive a short training on the law and procedures to be applied.142 This lack of 
legal education and training is extremely problematic, given that the right to a fair trial 
can be compromised if the judge did not undergo legal education. This is particularly 
problematic since the Gacaca courts are entitled to try suspects for crimes of genocide 
or crimes against humanity, which, in a classic court system, are usually to be tried in 
front of a jury.143 
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969cc6ecf2f9&Position=1&Kundmachungsorgan=&Index=&Titel=stgb&Gesetzesnummer=&VonArtike
l=&BisArtikel=&VonParagraf=&BisParagraf=&VonAnlage=&BisAnlage=&Typ=&Kundmachungsnum
mer=&Unterzeichnungsdatum=&FassungVom=11.01.2012&NormabschnittnummerKombination=Und&
ImRisSeit=Undefined&ResultPageSize=100&Suchworte=v%c3%b6lkermord, 11/1/2012, and 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Dokumentnummer=NOR40124595&
ResultFunctionToken=82d2ec63-7eae-49f3-960e-
2c37315bb299&Position=1&Kundmachungsorgan=&Index=&Titel=stpo&Gesetzesnummer=&VonArtik
el=&BisArtikel=&VonParagraf=&BisParagraf=&VonAnlage=&BisAnlage=&Typ=&Kundmachungsnu
mmer=&Unterzeichnungsdatum=&FassungVom=11.01.2012&NormabschnittnummerKombination=Und
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Ingelaere points out that the ordinary Rwandan citizen prefers the Gacaca courts 
over the classical judicial system and the ICTR, as those are institutions that do not 
convey the idea of a justice of proximity, which tends to be better accepted.144 The 
Gacaca courts are helping Rwanda coming to terms with the genocide in the fact that 
they reduce the backlog of genocide-related cases145 and prisoners awaiting trial even 
after more than 17 years after the genocide have passed. However, while the legal 
qualifications of the Gacaca judges to deal with such serious issues remain questionable, 
survivors also feel that the state is the only one to benefit from Gacaca trials, as 
imprisonment and community service are regarded as being to the benefit of the state 
rather than to the benefit of the individual survivors.146  
 
In addition, the fact that the Gacaca courts are not able to address crimes 
committed by the RPF and revenge killings by Tutsi civilians often leads to the 
impression of victor’s justice in the eyes of the Hutu community147, thereby adding 
further to the ethnic split of the population instead of aiding reconciliation among the 
two primary ethnic groups of the country, the Hutu and the Tutsi. Gacaca court sessions 
hold another complication for many of the women victims in the communities: As the 
sessions are public and attendance is mandatory148, it is very difficult for the Gacaca 
courts to deal with sexual violence in the required privacy for the victim.149 As it is the 
case with other judicial systems150, proceedings in the Gacaca courts can be held 
without the attendance of the public if required; however, Ingelaere explains that this 
                                                                                                                        
&ImRisSeit=Undefined&ResultPageSize=100&Suchworte=geschworenengericht+zust%c3%a4ndig, 
11/1/2012). 
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 See Ingelaere, Bert : The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda (2008), p. 51 
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 See ibid, p. 52 
146
 See ibid, p. 48 
147
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148
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149
 See ibid, p. 184 
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 In Austria, court sessions can be conducted without the attendance of the public in case this is required 
as e.g. aspects concerning the personal sphere of a suspect, victim, witness or third person are to be 
discussed (see §229 Abs 1 Z 1 StPO, 
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f5fc8f76adc9&Position=1&Kundmachungsorgan=&Index=&Titel=stpo&Gesetzesnummer=&VonArtikel
=&BisArtikel=&VonParagraf=&BisParagraf=&VonAnlage=&BisAnlage=&Typ=&Kundmachungsnum
mer=&Unterzeichnungsdatum=&FassungVom=11.01.2012&NormabschnittnummerKombination=Und&
ImRisSeit=Undefined&ResultPageSize=100&Suchworte=ausschluss+der+%c3%b6ffentlichkeit, 
11/1/2012). 
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does not seem to facilitate the proceedings given the local embedding of the Gacaca 
courts.151   
 
Nevertheless, the Gacaca Courts have been successful in trying a high number of 
suspects and reducing the number of prisoners in Rwanda, thereby also improving their 
detention conditions as prisons are less overcrowded than prior to the Gacaca trials. As 
the Rwandan delegation to the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review 
pointed out, the number of genocide convicts serving time in Rwandan prisons in 2011 
had decreased to approximately 38.000 persons, with the remaining convicts 
reintegrated into their communities.152 The level of reintegration remains questionable 
however; and while the Rwandan government insists that there have not been any 
revenge killings in the communities, it remains to be seen whether the reintegration has 
been as successful as announced or whether the situation resembles more a powder-keg 
on which a lid has been placed.  
 
To conclude, while the Gacaca courts have proven to be important instruments 
of transitional justice in Rwanda and greatly facilitate the coming to terms with the 
crimes committed during the genocide, it is equally important to remember and work on 
the inadequacies this system has in terms of fair trial guarantees and legal qualifications. 
In Rwanda, mass atrocities required an additional response outside the pre-established 
judicial system; however, the guarantees of that system need to be respected also in 
alternative forms of justice.  
 
This is particularly true for transitional justice courts are authorized to sentence 
and imprison persons. Other forms of transitional justice mechanisms that are conceived 
as clearer alternatives to the judicial system, such as truth commissions, need to respect 
the fair trial guarantees just as much as the judicial system needs to; however, they are 
less likely to infract those guarantees as they tend not to be able to imprison or sentence 
people in a similar way to the judicial system.  
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3.3.2 Uganda: The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights 
 
Uganda, following the atrocities committed during the rule of Idi Amin, opted 
for a truth commission as a mechanism of transitional justice to investigate potential 
human rights violations. The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights 
was set up by the Minister of Justice/Attorney General through a legal notice of 16 May 
1986 and was given a large time-frame to investigate, starting with independence on 9 
October 1962 till 25 January 1986, when Museveni came into power153.154 It also had a 
particularly broad mandate and was tasked with inquiring into: 
 
[…] 
• the causes and circumstances surrounding the mass murders and 
all acts or omissions resulting in the arbitrary deprivation of 
human life, committed in various parts of Uganda; 
• the causes and circumstances surrounding the numerous 
arbitrary arrests, consequent detentions without trial, arbitrary 
imprisonment and abuse of the powers of detention and 
restriction under the Public Order and Security Act, 1967; 
• the denial of any person of a fair and public trial before an 
independent and impartial court established by law; 
• the subjection of any person to torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment; 
• the manner in which the law enforcement agents and the state 
security agencies executed their functions, the extent to which the 
practices and procedures employed in the execution of such 
functions may have violated the human rights of any person and 
the extent to which the state security agencies may have interfered 
with the functioning of the law-enforcement agents; 
• the causes and circumstances surrounding the massive 
displacement of persons and expulsion of people including 
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 Complete text available under 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Uganda86-Charter.pdf, 11/1/2012 
Iustitia post bellum – Re-establishing judicial systems in post-conflict situations 
 
50 
 
Uganda citizens from Uganda and the consequent disappearance 
or presumed death of some of them; 
• the subjection of any person to discriminatory treatment by virtue 
of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, creed or sex, by 
any person acting under any written law or in the performance of 
the functions of any public office or public authority; 
• the denial to any person of any other fundamental freedoms and 
rights prescribed under Chapter III of the Constitution of Uganda 
or the un-lawful interference with the enjoyment by any person in 
Uganda of the said freedoms and rights; 
• the protection by act or omission of any person that perpetrated 
any of the aforesaid things, from due process of law; 
• any other matter connected with or incidental to the matters 
aforesaid which the Commission may wish to examine and 
recommend.155 
 
The mandate of the truth commission includes several tasks directly related to 
the judicial system in place during Idi Amin and Milton Obote’s rule, in particular the 
denial of a fair trial and the arbitrary detentions or detentions without trial. The 
commission itself was to determine where and when to hold its meetings, and whether 
these meetings were to be public, partly public or private.156 This provision can help 
protect the privacy of victims and witnesses if meetings are conducted in private. 
 
However, the commission was to report back to the Minister of Justice, which 
could lead to its interpretation as dependent on the government rather than being an 
independent instrument of transitional justice. In addition, the commission ran into 
serious financial trouble which hampered its work, at one point, it was only to continue 
working thanks to a donation of the Ford Foundation to the Ugandan government.157  
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While the commission’s report of 1994 was not widely disseminated, its major 
conclusions and recommendations became known: The commission has found evidence 
of widespread arbitrary detention and recommended the repeal of laws allowing 
detention without trial as well as the incorporation of human rights education into 
school and university curricula as well as into the training programs of the army and 
security forces.158 
 
While those findings and recommendations form a starting point for addressing 
human rights violations, there is, as newspapers criticize, no inquiry into potential 
human rights violations committed under the current president Yoweri Museveni’s 
rule.159 In addition, the Commission of Inquiry is also criticized by some as being a 
“[…] political strategy to provide legitimacy to the current government.”160 This casts a 
shadow on the work of the Commission of Inquiry and, alongside with the fact that, 
even 17 years after its end, the report is not widely disseminated, raises questions about 
its effectiveness.  
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4 Post-conflict situations and their specific challenges to judicial 
systems 
 
While post-conflict situations all share common characteristics, it cannot be 
disregarded that each post-conflict situation is different and unique. The historical 
context, the composition of society, the resources in terms of infrastructure and 
education, the judicial system in place before and during the conflict as well as the 
conflict itself are distinct in every post-conflict situation. Therefore, also the challenges 
the judicial systems are experiencing in post-conflict situation vary from country to 
country and from conflict to conflict. This implies that no one-size-fits-all approaches 
and no such solutions can be implemented for all judicial systems in post-conflict 
situations. 
 
Nevertheless, there are certain challenges that most states in post-conflict 
situations share, and they are worth being examined in more detail as any ways of 
addressing such challenges might serve as building blocks of a comprehensive response, 
which can be fine-tuned and adjusted to the particular post-conflict situation in order to 
in re-establish a judicial system in any particular case. OHCHR determines the 
following challenges as reappearing frequently in post-conflict situations: 
 
 a dysfunctional judicial system whose staff members have either left the 
country or are completely discredited in the eyes of the public, 
 a police which has been part of the problem as violators of human rights, 
and whose staff has either fled or is completely rejected by the 
population, 
 overcrowded prisons in which brutality has reigned and people have been 
detained for years without charge or trial, 
 a shattered, terrified local civil society which lacks resources and whose 
most effective leaders have either been killed or forced into exile 
 corruption and trafficking is rampant 
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 landmines pose a great danger and limit the freedom of movement and 
economic activity, in particular with regards to agriculture.161 
 
This non-exhaustive list demonstrates that judicial systems in post-conflict 
situations are faced with much more challenges than one would initially expect. These 
challenges lie on several different, although interdependent, levels. The most important 
challenges to a judicial system in a post-conflict situation can be examined on three 
levels: 
 
 Firstly, on the legal level, as a judicial system might not have the required 
independence, or as legislation might not be compliant with international standards for 
human rights and treaties that the state concerned is a party to. Secondly, the judicial 
system might not be sufficiently staffed or staff might be not suitable to carry out its 
assigned tasks because of a lack in training, its affiliation with the crimes committed 
during the conflict or rampant corruption. On the same level, the qualifications or lack 
of qualified defence lawyers can be situated. As OHCHR points out, in many post-
conflict states, an independent defence bar does not exist, in particular if there are not 
enough lawyers and most of them are concentrated in the capital, as it was the case in 
Rwanda and as it is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.162 Thirdly, the 
required infrastructure to render the judicial system efficient and fair, such as accessible 
(both in terms of roads and in terms of landmine-free surroundings) and suitable court 
houses and prisons, might never have existed or might have been destroyed during the 
conflict.   
 
On the legal level, if the basic principle of the independence of the judiciary is 
not respected, the population will not be able to trust the judiciary and will not approach 
it for help as the judiciary will always be regarded as part of the regime and as 
controlled by it. People will not accept its rulings as fair, as favouritism and political 
gain are likely to be influencing judicial decisions greatly.  
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Similarly, if the legislation in place is not in accordance with international 
human rights standards and treaties by which the state in question is bound, the decision 
taken and the punishments inflicted by the judicial system will be regarded as illegal. In 
addition, if judicial decisions contradict these standards and norms, they are likely to be 
regarded as cruel and inhumane by both the local population and the international 
community.   
 
Therefore, should the initial review have resulted in the conclusion that the 
judicial system is not independent, the provisions regarding the establishment of the 
judiciary, which are likely to be found in the constitution or a legal framework of 
similar rank, should be reviewed to ensure the independence of the judiciary. 
Furthermore, if national legislation is out-dated or infracts international human rights 
standards, the necessary amendments to render it compliant with those standards need to 
be made. If such amendments are being made, it is of crucial importance to ensure their 
communication not only to the legal professionals concerned, such as judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers, but also to the general population in order to enable it to hold 
the judicial system accountable.  
 
In determining the strategy to adopt to re-establish a judicial system, it is 
important to start addressing by a stock-taking exercise: Trying to understand how the 
judicial system worked before and during the conflict needs to be the starting point of 
any efforts to re-establish a judicial system. OHCHR explains this in the context of 
peacekeeping operations163; however, their argument is equally valid in any other post-
conflict situation, even when there is no peacekeeping mission present to work on the 
re-establishment of a judicial system. Mapping the judicial system not only on a 
qualitative level regarding the court structure, appellate courts, the categorization of 
crimes and the procedures in place, but also on a quantitative level regarding the 
number of courts in place, their staffing and caseload, is of crucial importance to 
planning the re-establishment of a judicial system and to making informed decisions on 
how to approach this task.164  In addition, understanding any potential role the judiciary 
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and the police have played in the conflict is crucial165, as only such knowledge about the 
institutions and subsequent changes to their behaviour will help the state concerned 
emerge from its post-conflict situation.  
 
The staffing of the judicial system is of utmost importance. If judges and 
prosecutors, but also court clerks and administrative personnel do not have the required 
training and corruption is widespread among them, the judicial system will be regarded 
as inefficient in the best case and as partial, unfair and nepotistic in the worst case.  
 
Therefore, the stock-taking exercise has to continue with regards to the 
personnel working within the judicial system, from the judges to the prosecutors, court 
clerks and administrative personnel as well as to the lawyers. Concerning the officials 
already serving, a vetting exercise to determine their suitability for continuing in office 
as suggested by OHCHR166 can be of great help in establishing an independent judicial 
system and in ensuring that the renewed system is not seen as a continuation of the old, 
potentially oppressive or opportunist judicial system. Officials who have committed 
crimes before or during the conflict have to be removed from office and replaced by 
new recruits. However, it can be a case-by-case decision on whether or not to remove 
certain officials, as e.g. corruption tends to be so widespread in certain post-conflict 
situations that it will be difficult to find officials that have never accepted a bribe.167 
Concerning new recruits, the appointment process has to be reviewed168 and vetted to 
guarantee that it is fair and offers equal opportunities to all applicants.  
 
In order to remove incentives for corruption, the salary system of the judicial 
personnel should be reviewed and the regular payment of salaries should be ensured. 
However, this is likely to pose a problem as states in post-conflict situations tend not to 
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be extremely affluent or extremely punctual in their salary payments. Nevertheless, 
regarding the importance of the judicial system, this should be made a priority. 
International donors could help improve the situation by either imposing such a 
condition on their bilateral or multilateral aid or by concentrating their direct aid to the 
judicial system also on the payment of salaries. In addition, any existing codes of 
conduct for the judicial personnel should be reviewed or if they do not exist, the option 
of introducing such codes of conduct could be discussed. 
 
Once the vetting exercise has taken place, a review of strengths and weaknesses 
of the existing staff will reveal in which areas capacity-building could be required. In 
accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness169, the indications for which 
areas require capacity-building should come from the post-conflict country170. 
International organizations and donors should then carefully plan their training activities 
on these matters to reach out to the officials in the most efficient way, structuring 
training along practical cases that the officials are likely to encounter in their daily 
work.171  
 
In addition to training courses, it might prove successful to adopt a mentoring 
approach, which would see donors send highly specialized personnel, such as judges or 
prosecutors, but also court administrators, to post-conflict states for a certain period of 
time, e.g. six months to one year, to provide on-the-job training and advice on ongoing 
cases. While this requires significantly more commitment from the donors (as the 
mentor will have to be replaced in his or her own professional activity at home), it is 
likely to yield better results than short, general training courses. However, the 
mentoring activities should not replace the training courses entirely to ensure the 
participation of all the judicial personnel concerned and to create a common level of 
knowledge among all the personnel on which any future training or on-the-job advice 
can be built. For the mentors to become effective as quickly as possible, it is desirable 
for them to have intimate knowledge of the post-conflict states judicial system as well 
as on the conflict in order to structure their activities in the most beneficial way and to 
avoid pitfalls. Mentors with a background in a similar legal system, in particular 
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regarding the differences between common law or civil law systems, are likely to be 
more effective as they are familiar with the specific challenges posed by the system in 
place.  
 
To ensure that potential future applicants have all the required competencies, the 
curricula of law faculties should be reviewed and modernized where necessary.172 This 
holds especially true if, in the first step of the stock-taking exercise, the review of 
legislation, legislation has been determined as out-dated or as contradicting human 
rights standards and has been updated or amended accordingly. OHCHR presents 
several examples of OSCE or United Nations staff teaching classes in law faculties in 
several post-conflict countries, including Rwanda, themselves, and reiterates the 
importance of working with law professors in order to ensure the sustainability of this 
effort.173 
 
If a bar association exists in the post-conflict state, it is important to imply it 
early in the re-establishment process to ensure the participation in and acceptance of the 
new system by the lawyers. As for the judicial personnel, a vetting exercise for lawyers 
could help improve the system, in particular if lawyers have been part of the oppressive 
system (as it was the case in Rwanda, as OHCHR points out174). If no bar association 
exists, the introduction of an independent association might be worth discussing, in 
particular with regards to the induction of new lawyers and the disciplinary powers over 
its members that a bar association can have.175 
 
In addition to the vetting and capacity-building exercises, monitoring should be 
brought in to ensure the performance of the judicial system. In this regard, OHCHR 
explains that any attempts to influence a jurist’s behaviour or the outcome of cases, as 
well as allegations of corruption and extortion should be recorded, investigated and 
documented, while the same holds true as well for any attacks or other violence directed 
at anyone working in the legal system.176  
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On a very practical level, the infrastructure at the disposal of the judicial system 
needs to be examined and readjusted. In particular, prisons and detention centres are 
likely to pose an enormous challenge in post-conflict situations177: While there are 
frequently more detainees following the conflict, the conditions in prisons are often 
completely deteriorated, the buildings are overcrowded, there is poor or little food, 
access to clean drinking water might be limited and diseases might be spreading without 
medical control.178 In addition, many prisons pose serious risks to detainees, in 
particular if they are held without their families’ knowledge and without access to 
lawyers.179 The discussion of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners below will explain that detaining juveniles together with adults 
and men and women together exposes prisoners to great risk and has to be avoided, yet 
this is often standard practice in post-conflict countries.  
 
While it will be almost impossible to immediately render prisons and detention 
centres compliant with international standards, this problem needs to be tackled 
immediately as overcrowded detention centres with poor standards are against 
international human rights. In doing so, in particular in adapting the infrastructure and 
in building new detention facilities, the financial support and technical know-how of 
international organizations and donors is required. Even if this support is given, the 
adaptation and rebuilding will require a certain amount of time during which detainees 
have to remain in the old, unsuitable buildings.  
 
Nevertheless, their detention conditions can be improved immediately through a 
complete abolition of torture in prisons and through regular visits by medical staff. In 
addition, no incommunicado detention should be allowed and regular visits by family 
and lawyers should be facilitated. Furthermore, the ICRC, which is present in most 
post-conflict countries, should be allowed to conduct regular visits in accordance with 
its mandate.180  
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Furthermore, the case handling and documentation system needs to be examined 
and potential amendments need to be made. If possible, files that have been lost during 
the conflict should be retrieved or reconstructed. However, the reconstruction of files 
holds a great danger if no detailed, reliable information is available. If the necessary 
information has been lost, the release of the detainee and the non-prosecution of 
suspects will be the most likely result in order to prevent system abuse and protect the 
population from arbitrary judicial decisions and arbitrary detention. While it will be 
impossible to set up a state-of-the art, electronic file management system in most post-
conflict countries given the fact that there often are no computers or even electricity in 
the court buildings (if those exist), donors should focus on the supply of required 
material such as paper, binders, typewriters etc. to the administration. This is the case 
for both the court administration and the administration of law enforcement, as 
particularly in detention facilities, the meticulous record-keeping decides over whether a 
person who has served his or her sentence is being released on time or not.  
 
Another challenge to the judicial system is the role of the military: OHCHR 
explains that, in states that are emerging from a conflict, the armed forces have often 
played a role in the administration of justice – and their role has usually been a negative 
one.181 However, following the theory of the separation of powers according to 
Montesquieu, the judiciary, the legislative and the executive should be separated in a 
state.182 Modern democracies follow this dogma in a refined version. While the three 
functions are separated, there are inter-related checks and balances183 in order to ensure 
the adherence to the highest standards of human rights and independence. OHCHR 
continues to explain that the interference of the military in court cases usually consists 
of intimidation of judges and prosecutors or usurpation of the police function, while the 
armed forces also arrest and detain civilians.184  
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The usurpation of police functions by the military poses a particular problem, as 
this is a systemic challenge that cannot be address by simply removing individuals 
responsible for arbitrary arrests or for the intimidation of a judge from the armed forces. 
While the military often expands its functions in a crisis and in its immediate aftermath, 
it is important that, as soon as a certain state of calm and quiet is achieved, the military 
renounces to these additional tasks, accepts its much-diminished role in law 
enforcement and returns to concentrating on its core tasks of national defence and 
emergency relief185.  
 
However, as it is the case in most post-conflict situations, the military is likely to 
want to contain exercising these additional powers, in particular if there are militia 
groups active in the state territory. This is only one of the reasons why the 
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of militia groups, which threaten 
the instable balance of peace in a post-conflict society, is of crucial importance.186   
 
The entire process of re-establishing the judicial system should be accompanied 
by a communication campaign aimed at the general population in order to inform them 
of the changes taking place in the judicial system. Furthermore, the population should 
be informed of the procedure established to complain about officials not complying 
with their duties or acting against the law. In addition, monitoring of the results of the 
reform, in particular through the observation of trials and pre-trial procedure187, should 
take place to ensure compliance with the newly established standards and to provide on-
the-job advice on the new procedures whenever necessary.  
 
If there is a peacekeeping mission in place, the mission might conduct such 
monitoring activities. If this is not the case, the international community, in particular 
international organizations such as the United Nations, but also international lawyers’ 
associations such as the Union Internationale des Avocats (UIA)188, the International 
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Bar Association (IBA)189, the Association Internationale des Jeunes Avocats- 
International Association of Young Lawyers (AIJA)190, the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe (CCBE)191 and  the American Bar Association (ABA)192 can be of 
great help in monitoring progress. While the constant monitoring through field-based 
assessors with detailed knowledge of local processes is preferable to ensure continuing 
improvements and feed-back as well as on-the-job training to stakeholders, short 
assessment missions focusing on the progress made since the last visit can also be 
successful.  
  
While this strategy can be applied and adjusted to most post-conflict situations, 
one of the primary requirements for the successful re-establishment of an independent 
and fair judicial system remains the same: The political will to establish such a system 
needs to be present, otherwise, all efforts by civil society and the international 
community will not be sufficient to ensure its establishment and functioning. On a 
political level, it can be difficult to judge whether a post-conflict state is willing to make 
this effort and render the judiciary independent and functional, but does not manage to 
do so because of structural and financial constraints or whether any lukewarm efforts to 
establish such a system are merely concealing the fact that the government is, for 
whatever reason, not interested in having an independent judiciary. 
 
In carrying out this assessment, it is important to keep in mind the reasons and 
roots of the conflict, as internal conflicts, such as civil war, and external conflicts, such 
as classic inter-state war, can have completely different consequences for the internal 
institutions of a state, including the government and the judicial system. Nevertheless, it 
is safe to say that democratic governments tend to be interested in establishing an 
independent judicial system, whereas dictators might prefer to be able to use the 
judiciary to their own benefits. While regime changes might initially make it difficult to 
determine whether a government adheres to democratic standards or not, the re-
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establishment of a judicial system requires more than enough time to let all 
implementing partners understand each other’s intentions and ideas.  
 
However, if a new regime proves to be undemocratic, the international 
community and the donor countries or agencies should continue their efforts in 
coordination with the civil society. While it might not be possible to achieve a perfectly 
independent and efficiently functioning judicial system, adherence to basic human 
rights standards and the improvement of detention conditions can be achieved also 
under a government that might not be the gold standard in terms of democratic 
behaviour.  
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5 Rebuilding judicial systems as integral part of state-building 
initiatives 
 
5.1 State-building and the judicial system 
 
While the judiciary, as explained above, has to be independent from any undue 
influence by the government or other state or non-state-actors, it can nevertheless play a 
crucial role in successful state-building: One of the most important problems in many 
post-conflict states, such as the DRC, is complete impunity for perpetrators of crimes. 
This is the case for serious offences, such as crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the 
ICC, as well as for murder, rape and petty crimes that are committed at the time of the 
conflict or in the post-conflict situation, but do not have any links to the conflict and are 
part of everyday criminality in many post-conflict states.  
 
The only way to end impunity and establish the most basic functions of a state is 
by re-establishing a functioning, independent judicial system to address everyday 
criminality, in addition to which transitional justice mechanisms might be instituted as 
required to handle crimes committed during the conflict. This is particularly true as 
other state functions, such as for example the provision of medical care, can be 
outsourced and provided by e.g. non-governmental organizations during and in the 
immediate aftermath of a conflict. NGOs can train the judicial personnel and contribute 
to the reconstruction of the necessary infrastructure; however, they cannot provide any 
substitution of a judicial system. While the international community might do so with 
its institutions of transitional justice, these do not address everyday crime or crime that 
was not committed in connection with a conflict, thereby leaving an institutional gap 
that can only be filled by the state itself.   
 
A functioning judicial system reduces the incentive to take extrajudicial 
measures, such as revenge on the perpetrators of crimes that might have been committed 
during the conflict or already in the post-conflict period, and thereby greatly increases a 
state’s chances to achieve a certain level of internal security. Jones et al. show also how 
a malfunctioning, weak and corrupt judicial system can increase the prevalence of 
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organized crime, political assassinations, but also petty crime, in addition to 
extrajudicial killings.193 Furthermore, the establishment of a functional, predictable 
judicial system is crucial to the attraction of external investment, which is something 
most post-conflict countries are aiming to do, by providing investors with the possibility 
of having their claims enforced if they are based on correct interpretations of the law.  
 
However, re-establishing such a system as part of a state-building exercise can 
be a daunting task: As Fukuyama explains, establishing a rule of law requires work on 
laws, courts, judges, a bar and enforcement mechanisms throughout an entire country194, 
which might be particularly difficult should the country concerned be of a major size 
(such as e.g. the DRC) and have very little to no infrastructure at all in place. Fukuyama 
even goes so far as to calling the establishment of a rule of law “one of the most 
complex administrative tasks that state-builders need to accomplish”195.  
 
However, this formulation demonstrates that establishing the rule of law, and 
therefore a judicial system, is non-negotiable in state-building exercises if the 
international community wants them to be effective. Without the establishment of a rule 
of law, however difficult it might be and however modest it is likely to be at the 
beginning, no post-conflict state will be able to progress from its current status.  
 
To determine the role of the judicial system in state-building, it is important to 
start with defining a state itself. The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, adopted 
on 26 December 1933 by the Seventh International Conference of American States at 
Montevideo, Uruguay, entered into force on 26 December 1934.196 In its article 1, it 
defines a state as follows:  
 
The state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined 
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territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations 
with the other states.197  
 
While this treaty was negotiated at a Conference of American States and 
excluded the rest of the world and does not have any parties that are not American 
States198, the definition set forth in article 1 gained wider recognition. Fischer and Köck 
reiterate the opinion that a state exists if the trias of a permanent population, 
independent power and a defined state territory is present; however, they argue that the 
fourth criterion, the capacity to enter into relations with other states (or the capacity to 
act in accordance with public international law, as they phrase it) cannot be regarded as 
constitutive as the incapacity to act according to public international law would mean a 
lack of sufficient state organization, which by definition contradicts the existence of a 
state.199 As the definition using only the trias of a permanent population, independent 
power and a defined state territory is widely accepted in public international law, the 
present paper is using this definition.  
  
With regard to state-building, several definitions have been used throughout the 
relevant literature. Fukuyama defines state-building as the creation of new government 
institutions and the strengthening of existing ones200, while Chesterman provides more 
detail on his definition by stating that: 
 
[…]  
state-building refers to extended international involvement 
(primarily, though not exclusively, through the United Nations) 
that goes beyond traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
mandates, and is directed at constructing or reconstructing 
institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with 
physical and economic assistance.201 
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He then continues to describe that state-building in his terms includes quasi-
governmental activities as well as human rights and rule of law technical assistance202, 
which frames the judicial system as a sector that might require technical assistance in a 
state-building exercise.  
 
Caplan, on the other hand, defines state-building as referring to “efforts to 
reconstruct, or in some cases to establish for the first time, effective and autonomous 
structures of governance in a state or territory where no such capacity exists or where it 
has been seriously eroded”.203 
 
All the definitions share the common point of view that state-building can start 
with two different scenarios: firstly, if there have been no institutions in place prior to 
the state-building efforts, the construction of such governance institutions or structures 
needs to be addressed, or secondly, if there have been weak institutions in place, they 
need to be strengthened in order to become effective. Chesterman is the only one to 
directly address the implication of international actors; however, while Fukuyama and 
Caplan do not incorporate the international aspect in their definitions, they are not 
excluding the fact that international involvement in state-building exercises might occur 
or might even be necessary. In practice, in almost all, if not in all, state-building efforts, 
the international community will be involved either through the United Nations, the 
African Union or other international organizations or through direct bilateral technical 
assistance delivered from states.  
 
The present paper is focused on the first case of state-building, as both in 
Rwanda and Uganda, a judicial system and governance institutions were established 
prior to the conflicts, even if they were in dire need of improvements. However, 
additional institutions can be established also in these countries, be it transitional justice 
structures to deal with the additional amount of trials to be held as consequence of the 
conflict (such as the gacaca courts in Rwanda) or other governance structures that are 
supposed to be of a more permanent nature.  
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While the implication of the international community has major benefits, such as 
the fact that donors are making funds and qualified personnel available, this 
involvement does not come without drawbacks: Fukuyama points out one of the key 
issues concerning the reestablishment of judicial systems by stating that “[t]he 
international community knows how to supply government services; what it knows 
much less well is how to create self-sustaining indigenous institutions.”204 This is 
particularly true when it comes to the judicial system. As Jones et al. explain, it is 
difficult to strengthen rule-of law institutions externally205 and the construction or the 
re-establishment of justice systems can be extremely difficult, in particular in countries 
that suffer from little formal rule of law at the beginning of the reconstruction period.206 
 
Having determined the importance of the judicial system in state-building 
exercises, the question on how to best address this issue in practice remains to be 
solved: As described above, there are several levels that are important to the 
reconstruction of judicial systems: the required infrastructure needs to be available, 
trained personnel needs to be recruited, and a sound legal base needs to be established 
for judges to work with.  
 
To start the internationally-aided reconstruction of a legal system in general, 
thus including the judicial system, Jones et al. propose a three-tiered approach:  
 
1) Determine whether a previous rule of law can be drawn on 
2) Deploy fully trained personnel from a pre-established, fully recruited pool of 
criminal justice personnel 
3) Reconstruct and train personnel to comprise and indigenous criminal justice 
system207 
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The first step, the stock-taking exercise, needs to be carried out with great 
political sensitivity: While a legal system might be in place, it might be necessary to 
decide its substitution by a different system or different laws governing certain 
particular issues to avoid association with the previous regime (this might prove to be 
the case in particular with regime changes or transition from a dictatorship to a 
democracy). In general, the constitution and other high-ranking laws are more likely to 
be replaced in a transitory phase than other, less political and more practical rules.  
 
While the second step, the immediate deployment of fully trained personnel, 
might greatly advance the re-establishment of a judicial system, as of today, there is no 
such pool of trained personnel available. Furthermore, even trained professionals would 
require the necessary time to familiarize with the potentially new legal system and its 
traditions before being able to deliver high-quality legal work.  
 
The third step, the training of personnel to constitute an indigenous criminal 
justice system, is of particular importance, as it is the only way for a judicial system to 
become fully independent of donors and technical assistance providers. There are 
several initiatives aiming at training the personnel and building additional capacities, 
such as the American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative208, which also has a 
specialized segment on judicial reform.209 In terms of Jones et al.’s three-tiered 
approach to re-establishing judicial systems, it is important to note that step three can be 
carried out even without the deployment of fully trained professionals from a pre-
established pool as foreseen by step two. Until such a pool ever becomes reality, 
capacity building will have to happen without such deployments.  
 
Fukuyama also points out that there is another factor that matters in all state-
building exercises, in particular when it comes to institutional reform, stating that their 
success depends also on the domestic demand for institutions and their subsequent 
creation out of whole cloth rather than by importing or adapting foreign models to local 
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conditions.210 He also points out that, should such domestic demand be lacking, it would 
have to be created externally, such as through conditions attached to donor programs, or 
through the direct exercise of power.211 
 
On a national level, the key governmental actors to be involved in the re-
establishment of the judicial system are likely to be the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of the Interior (for law enforcement issues). On a civil society base, bar 
associations and potentially judges’ associations have to be involved in order for them 
to be able to serve as independent disciplinary and oversight body, which might also be 
responsible for ensuring compliance with required qualifications of the legal 
professions.  
 
On the international level, institutions such as the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP, for issues concerning democratic governance212 and general capacity 
building213) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF, for all issues involving 
juvenile delinquents, such as e.g. juvenile justice courts in the DRC214). OHCHR is 
available for technical assistance in human rights matters.215 Furthermore, international 
non-governmental organizations such as the American Bar Association216 can be 
implementing projects on training and qualifications of personnel or on rebuilding or 
rehabilitating the necessary infrastructure.  
 
Furthermore, the protection of victims and witness, but also of court officials is 
of utmost concern. As shown by the Iraqi example, judges might be reluctant to try 
serious cases involving powerful criminals for fears of their own and their families’ 
safety.217 Therefore, in the re-establishment of a judicial system, the state concerned 
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needs to take into account any potential threats against its judicial personnel, and 
elaborate ways and strategies to effectively tackle such threats.  
 
5.2 International standards and norms 
 
 As each post-conflict situation is different from the ones experiences before and 
the ones likely to happen afterwards in terms of the conflict experienced, the social 
context and the systems in place before, during and after the conflict, it is impossible to 
devise a blueprint of international standards and norms that, if implemented, will 
catapult a society from a post-conflict situation to a peaceful and thriving environment. 
This holds true not only for the reconstruction of political and social life, infrastructures 
and basic services, but also for the re-establishment of judicial systems. Additionally, as 
Fukuyama explains, “[…] the development of formal institutions is strongly affected by 
cultural factors”218.  
 
 However, internationally or multilaterally agreed upon standards and norms can 
be of great help for states or the international community looking for indicators on how 
to best re-establish or reform any given system. With regard to the reestablishment of 
the judicial system, we are yet again faced with its particularity: Almost any society will 
have a certain - formal or informal - mechanism in place to deal with unwanted social 
behaviour. While those mechanisms might not be respecting human rights and basic 
liberties, it is necessary to closely examine them when deciding on how to structure or 
restructure the formal judicial system established by the state as people might not trust 
the new, “western” judicial system if it cannot be explained in relation to the established 
local mechanism or if it contradicts the local mechanisms without explanation of why 
this is the case.  
 
This means that any structural changes to an existing judicial system or any 
implementation of a new judicial system have to be carried out with great awareness to 
both cultural and social issues in order for the new system to be accepted by the society 
and international standards in order for the new or revised system to respect universal 
human rights and other norms. 
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 Given the fact that each judicial system is different and that, for reason of 
adaptation to any particular context, it is preferable not to simply import the judicial 
system of another country (which would be easy to do, but would cause enormous 
problems of incongruence with other state institutions and procedures), certain 
international standards can be used to determine important pillars of a new judicial 
system.  
 
 Notwithstanding more specific instruments that might be available on a regional 
or bilateral basis, the most important international standards and norms in this exercise 
are the Conventions and Instruments of the Organization of the United Nations, such as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights219 and the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment220. 
However, given that the prison system as part of the law enforcement system has close 
links with the judicial system, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners221 will also briefly be discussed as they offer important 
indications for what a prison system needs to take into account.  
 
 Further international instruments available that are important in this context, but 
will not be discussed in detail in the present study include the following:  
 
 the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary222 
 the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers223 
 the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors224 
 the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power225 
 the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice226 
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 the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
the Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law227 
 the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment228 
 the Convention on the Rights of the Child229 (particularly important when 
discussing juvenile justice, as this issue is often not addressed in post-conflict 
judicial systems and law enforcement institutions) 
 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights230 
 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights231 
 
5.2.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
 
 Following the atrocities of the World War II, the General Assembly of the 
Organization of the United Nations (UN) embarked on the ambitious journey to develop 
a catalogue of minimum human rights to be granted to everyone regardless of their 
nationality, gender or origin. On 10 December 1948, it passed resolution 217 A (III)232, 
by which it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.233 The adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is celebrated every year on 10 December and 
this day has subsequently been named “Human Rights Day”.234  
 
As resolution of the General Assembly, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights does not constitute a legally binding instrument of public international law.235 
However, as a declaration of the world forum of all states, it expresses a strong political 
obligation for all participating states to concur with it. The fact that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is still controversial, in particular with regards to 
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the debate on whether the human rights set forth in the Declaration are westernized 
human rights and not universal human rights, as they claim to be, was demonstrated 
during the preparation to the second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 
1993.236 
 
Austria became a member of the United Nations in 1955; the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo was admitted a few months after its independence in 1960, while 
Rwanda and Uganda both joined the UN in 1962 shortly after their independence.237 
None of the states mentioned were thus participating as independent state and member 
of the United Nations in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.238  
 
The UDHR holds obligations for states on several levels, which may require 
amendments in the criminal code or a review of certain practices in law enforcement 
and judicial systems. While several articles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights are relevant to judicial systems, the most important ones are articles 8 to 11:  
 
Article 8. 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights 
granted him by the constitution or by law.239 
 
 Article 8 obliges the judiciary as well as any other tribunals to offer effective 
remedies for any violations of fundamental rights. This provision might prove 
particularly difficult to implement for countries in post-conflict situations, as 
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effectiveness is something very few of those states might be in a position to guarantee. 
However, while the judiciary needs to keep striving to achieve a certain degree of 
effectiveness, this provision also offers a starting point for donors in rebuilding a state 
in a post-conflict situation, as assistance to the judiciary could enable post-conflict 
states to abide by this provision faster and with better results than if they would be left 
on their own to re-establish a judicial system.  
 
Article 9. 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile.240 
 
 While article 9 is inter alia aimed at law enforcement agencies, in most legal 
systems, it is the task of the judiciary to determine whether someone is held in custody 
arbitrarily and to take measures against such arbitrary detention or arrest.  
 
Article 10. 
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination 
of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him.241 
 
 Article 10 sets forth the obligation for the judiciary as well as for any other 
tribunals (such as e.g. administrative tribunals) to be independent and impartial and to 
uphold the standards of fair trials. It obliges the judicial system to treat everyone with 
full equality and determines that hearings should be public. The judiciary is therefore 
bound to try suspects under the observation of the general public; however, certain 
exceptions can be made, in particular where required to protect the privacy or interests 
of the victim or witness.242  
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Article 11. 
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a 
public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for 
his defence. 
 
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, 
under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one 
that was applicable at the time the penal offence was 
committed.243 
 
 Article 11 may require amendments in the criminal code to establish the 
presumption of innocence foreseen in para. 1. This paragraph is vital to the judiciary, 
which is the keeper of the presumption of innocence and needs to bear this principle in 
mind throughout the entire process. It furthermore establishes the right to a fair trial and 
the right to defence, which includes the right to consult a lawyer or to be informed of 
procedural questions by the judge or other competent authorities. The wider scope of 
this provision means that, in order for it to be effective, an independent bar association 
or similar organization needs to be in place in the country in question to certify the 
qualification of lawyers to represent defendants at court.    
 
 Article 11, para. 2, establishes the principle of “nullum crimen sine lege” and 
“nulla poena sine lege”, which states that no one can be punished for an act that was not 
criminalized at the time of its commission. First established in article XV of the 
constitution of Maryland in 1776244, this principle went on to being an integral part 
(article 7) of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen245 of 1789, it 
quickly became one of the guiding principles of the rule of law.246 By determining that 
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no one can be punished for an act or an omission that was not criminalized at the time 
of its commission, it is conceived to prevent arbitrary jurisdiction and to promote legal 
certainty by helping citizens predict legal decisions.  
 
While the judiciary can uphold this principle for the national legislation through 
relatively simple research on the legal framework governing criminal justice at the time 
of commission of the offence, the reference to criminalization in international law can 
be of particular interest in post-conflict situations: As the criminal justice framework 
might not criminalize certain acts or omissions during the conflict, the judiciary has to 
refer to international standards, such as the Convention on the Prevention and the 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide247 or the Convention against Torture to determine 
whether a certain conduct was criminalized at an international level at the time of its 
commission. If so, the perpetrators have to be prosecuted and tried even though there 
was no national legislation criminalizing their conduct at the time of commission.  
 
5.2.2 The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
 
 The General Assembly to the United Nations adopted the United Nations 
Convention against Torture in its resolution A/RES/39/46 on 10 December 1984, 
exactly on the 36th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (or 
Human Rights Day 1984).248 The Convention entered into force on 26 June 1987, 30 
days after the twentieth States party had deposited its instrument of ratification, as 
stated in article 27 (1) of the Convention.249 While there are also other legal instruments 
against torture available, such as the Organization of American States’ Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture250, they will not be discussed here as the 
United Nations Convention against Torture is the most encompassing instrument open 
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for accession to all states world-wide and not only to a certain, regionally restrained 
group of states, as it is the case for the Inter-American Convention251.  
 
Austria, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda are all States parties to the UN 
Convention against Torture. Austria signed the Convention on 14 March 1985 and 
ratified it on 29 July 1987, while Rwanda acceded252 to the Convention on 15 December 
2008, very recently compared to Uganda and the DRC, which acceded on 3 November 
1986 and on 18 March 1996 respectively.253 To date, the Convention has 149 States 
parties (out of 193 UN Member States254) and 78 signatories.255  
 
Similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Convention 
against Torture contains several provisions that are of vital importance to the legal 
system. While most provisions would need to be contained in either the criminal code of 
the country in question or its constitution and would therefore require legislative work, 
they are equally important to the judicial system as it needs to bear these general 
principles in mind before, during and after trial and in the potential subsequent 
imprisonment of an offender. The most pertinent provisions of the UN Convention 
against Torture as regards the judicial system are included below:  
 
Article 1 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
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mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument 
or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of 
wider application. 
 
[…] 
 
Article 16 
1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory 
under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined 
in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations 
contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the 
substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the 
provisions of any other international instrument or national law 
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which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment or which relates to extradition or expulsion.256 
 
Article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture defines torture for the first time 
in an international treaty and has to be read in conjunction with article 16, also 
reproduced above.257 Article 1 sets out the main elements defining torture. Nowak and 
McArtur describe them as the involvement of a public official, the infliction of severe 
pain or suffering, intention and specific purpose.258 Members of the judicial system as 
well as members of the police and other investigating bodies are likely to be classified 
as public officials in most countries; therefore, this provision is of direct importance to 
them as they are themselves prohibited from torturing as well as from instigating 
another person to torture someone or to consent to such conduct259.  
 
This provision should serve directly as a guarantee to anyone in custody or being 
tried that he or she will not be tortured; however, this is not clearly spelt out as the 
Convention “lacks a general provision prohibiting torture or granting an individual 
human right not to be subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment […]”260. The 
so-called “lawful sanctions clause” set forth in the last sentence of article 1, para. 1, has 
been subject of much debate with regard to whether corporal punishment foreseen in 
particular by some Islamic states is in accordance with or against the Convention.261  
 
Article 4 
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences 
under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to 
commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes 
complicity or participation in torture.  
 
                                         
256
 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf, 18/12/2011 
257
 See Nowak, Manfred, and McArthur, Elizabeth : The United Nations Convention against Torture. A 
Commentary (2008) , p. 28 
258
 Ibid, p.28 
259
 Ibid, p. 77 
260
 Ibid, p. 61 
261
 Ibid, p. 79ff 
Iustitia post bellum – Re-establishing judicial systems in post-conflict situations 
 
82 
 
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account their grave 
nature.262 
 
 This obligation is crucial for states, as it may require legislative work to ensure 
that torture is included as an offence in their criminal code. Nowak and McArthur 
explain that, while there is no obligation to establish torture as a separate offence, 
practice has shown that this is the most suitable way to proceed.263 As with any other 
new offence, it is vital for the judicial system that this potentially new amendment to the 
criminal code is disseminated and that background documents (such as travaux 
préparatoires or other drafts circulated and potential comments made during the 
establishment of the offence) are made available to judges for them to be able to 
correctly interpret the offence and try suspects on the basis of the legal framework 
available.  
 
Article 5 
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 
in the following cases:  
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its 
jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers 
it appropriate. 
 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases 
where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its 
jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to 
any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article. 
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3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction 
exercised in accordance with internal law.264 
 
Similar to article 4, article 5 may require legislative amendments to ensure that 
all forms of jurisdiction required by the Convention are included in a country’s criminal 
code. This is particularly true for the universal jurisdiction set forth in article 5, para. 2, 
as it might be a new element for some countries.265 The principle of universal 
jurisdiction is revolutionary as it does not require any additional conditions apart from 
the authorities believing on reasonable grounds that a person present in a territory under 
its jurisdiction has committed an act of torture.266 As such, it is important for the judicial 
system to be aware of this possibility, as universal jurisdiction is usually foreseen only 
for crimes of similar gravity, if at all.  
 
Furthermore, the establishment of universal jurisdiction has a particular 
importance in military occupation of another state’s territory, which might become 
pertinent also in state-building exercises: If a foreign power de jure or de facto controls 
another state’s territory, it is obliged to exercise universal jurisdiction over that territory 
(Nowak and McArthur bring the example of the United States’ obligation to establish 
universal jurisdiction over alleged torturers present in Afghanistan, Iraq or Guantánamo 
Bay).267 
 
Article 5, para. 2, establishes the principle of “aut dedere aut judicare”, try or 
extradite, for any cases in which another state has jurisdiction over an alleged offender 
and is requesting his or her extradition.268 In this case, it is important for the judiciary to 
note that, if it decides to prosecute and try the alleged offender itself, the trial is 
supposed to be held within a certain reasonable amount of time. However, the definition 
of a reasonable amount of time within which a trial is supposed to be held is flexible 
and needs to be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. 
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Article 11 
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation 
rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements 
for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of 
arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under its 
jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture.269 
 
This provision calls for a systematic review of practices to determine whether 
they do or do not constitute torture. While this systematic review will not be done 
within the judicial system but rather by specialized commissions or bodies, article 11 
calls also for an active role of the judiciary: It reminds the judiciary that, in particular in 
dealing with torture cases, case law and established practices need to be re-examined in 
light of the most recent developments: A practice that was not deemed to constitute 
torture might 50 years ago might nowadays be classified as such, and it is the judiciary 
in the trial of the individual case who needs to establish whether this is the case or not. 
Nowak and McArthur point to the importance of the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners (discussed further below) for guidance on whether a certain 
practice constitutes torture or not.270 
 
Article 12 
Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities 
proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is 
reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been 
committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.271 
 
 Article 12 foresees the ex-officio investigation of potential cases of torture.272 In 
most countries, investigations will be started by law enforcement officials with an 
involvement of the judiciary at a later stage, e.g. when it comes to taking suspects into 
custody. This provision is of importance to the judiciary as it includes its obligation to 
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take necessary action in the actions for which it is responsible during an investigation. 
In addition, it also sets forth an obligation for the judiciary to jump-start investigations 
in cases in which it has reasonable grounds to believe that an act of torture or ill-
treatment has been committed. 
 
Article 13 
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he 
has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction 
has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and 
impartially examined by, its competent authorities. Steps shall be 
taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses are protected 
against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his 
complaint or any evidence given.273 
 
 Article 13 mirrors the right to ex-officio investigations established in article 12 
and requires that an investigation is carried out as response to a complaint by a potential 
victim of torture.274 Nowak and McArthur point out that, as article 13 constitutes the 
basic remedy of torture victims; it is also the basis for any potential reparation they 
might receive under article 14.275 The implications for the judiciary are almost the same 
as in article 12; however, the initiative for the investigation under article 14 is taken by 
the victim. As a victim might not be aware of how to make a formal submission of a 
complaint of torture or might be too afraid to do this, an allegation by the victim is 
sufficient to trigger the obligation of investigating the case.276 The judiciary needs to be 
aware of this, particularly in cases in which the allegation is made directly to it or is 
unearthed during a trial for another offence.  
 
Article 14 
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim 
of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to 
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fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as 
a result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to 
compensation. 
 
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other 
persons to compensation which may exist under national law.277 
 
The right to redress and compensation as set forth in article 14 concerns the 
judiciary in so far as it is, in many countries, likely to be the institution that will decide 
on the scope of reparations that a victim will receive. The “fair and adequate 
compensation” the victim is to receive will in most states depend on the gravity of the 
torture, potential aggravating circumstances etc. The judiciary needs also to bear in 
mind the “full rehabilitation” a victim should receive, and has to take adequate measures 
that this full rehabilitation is achieved.  
 
Article 15 
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is 
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be 
invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person 
accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.278 
 
Nowak and McArthur explain that, in accordance with the right to a fair trial, 
article 15 constitutes the absolute prohibition of torture and is intended to remove the 
incentive for torture to obtain evidence or a confession.279 This provision directly 
concerns the judiciary as it has to refuse evidence obtained through torture 
categorically, should it come across such evidence at any stage during a trial.  
 
To conclude, it can be stated that the United Nations Convention against Torture 
contains several provisions of great direct importance to the judiciary, which need to be 
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kept in mind at all stages of a trial. The Convention also demands higher levels of alert 
and judgement of the judiciary concerning evidence, allegations or formerly accepted 
practices that might have come to be regarded as torture, as it is its task to determine the 
presence of such evidence, allegations or practices and take a decision on how to 
proceed in the individual case. 
 
5.2.3 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
 
 The First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders (Crime Congress) adopted a set of Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners in 1955, which were subsequently approved by the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) by its resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 
2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977.280 While Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC were not 
independent neither at the time of the first Crime Congress nor at the time of the first 
approval of the rules in the ECOSOC, Austria, Belgium and the United Kingdom were 
all represented at the Congress and thus participated281 in the adoption of the Standard 
Minimum Rules.282 
 
 The Standard Minimum Rules set forth very practical rules for the organization 
of prison systems. In particular, they insist on the separation of convicted from untried 
prisoners (rule 8 b283) and the separation of young prisoners from adults (rule 8d284). 
States in post-conflict situations can turn directly to the Standard Minimum Rules to 
determine whether and how to reform their prison system in order to be compliant with 
international standards.  
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6 Recommendations for the practical implementation of the findings 
 
Subsequent to the theoretical analysis above, it is important to draw practical 
recommendations for the implementation of any projects aiming at the re-establishment 
of judicial systems in post-conflict situations.  
 
Following the same scheme developed in chapter four, in which three levels of 
re-establishing a judicial system have been developed, the practical recommendations 
also start on the legal level:  
 
Recommendations for the legal level:  
 
 External experts should be brought in to carry out a desk review and a 
practical review of the judicial system in place and the laws implemented 
together with national experts. This will guarantee both the external point of 
view, in particular with regards to international instruments to be included or 
legislation to be adapted to conform with such instruments as well as the 
inside knowledge of the practical application of national laws, any potential 
role the judicial system played within the conflict and potential political 
influences on the judicial system.  
 External experts should, wherever possible, be from similar legal systems to 
the one in place in the post-conflict state, as this will enable them to become 
effective faster and more efficient than other experts.  
 
Recommendations for the personnel level: 
 
 A vetting exercise for all currently serving staff should take place. Assessors 
should be both international and national experts to guarantee a fair 
assessment to the needs of the post-conflict state. The vetting exercise can 
also be used to identify needs for capacity-building among the judicial 
personnel. 
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 Application processes and appointment procedures should be reviewed by 
external and internal experts together in order to avoid personnel 
management susceptible to nepotism. 
 Staff serving the judicial system, from administrative staff to judges and 
prosecutors, should receive their salary on a regular basis to avoid incentives 
for corruption. 
 Staff should be paid competitively or at least at a level which ensures their 
and their families’ survival to reduce the risk of corruption.  
 Appropriate capacity-building exercises should be organized for the 
judiciary personnel at all levels, from legal training to case management and 
general administration.  
 Sufficient staff to serve the potentially increased need for justice after a 
conflict should be trained and made available for the judicial system.  
 Curricula of law faculties and judicial training centers should be reviewed to 
be adapted to the new legal basis and the reviewed judicial system.  
 Potential threats against the judicial personnel need to be examined and 
evaluated and strategies to address such threats and offer sufficient 
protection to judicial personnel need to be elaborated.  
 Victim and witness protection strategies, if necessary, need to be developed 
and implemented to ensure their participation in trials without fear of 
reprisals.  
 
Recommendations for the infrastructure level: 
 
 Basic working material such as paper, files etc. should be made available to 
the judicial system.  
 Court houses and prisons should be part of projects aiming at the 
reconstruction of the infrastructure missing or destroyed during the conflict. 
 Access to the judicial system, both in terms of placement of courts and their 
accessibility by road as well as the accessibility of prisons should be 
included in the decision on how to re-establish the judicial system.  
 International organizations with the appropriate mandates, such as the ICRC, 
should be given the possibility to visit prisons and detention centers and 
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make recommendations on how they can be rendered conform to 
international standards.  
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7 Conclusio (English) 
 
Judicial systems are of utmost importance to establishing and keeping peace and 
security as they deter criminal actions and ensure stability within a society. However, in 
many post-conflict situations, the judicial system is not functional or still suffering from 
the events that took place before or during the conflict.  
 
In order to help a state emerge from a post-conflict situation, re-establishing an 
independent, functional and efficient judicial system needs to be one of the priorities in 
any state-building exercise. On an international level, several legal instruments, such as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, are available 
to offer guidance and indications as to which elements have to be included in a judicial 
system for it to be independent and functional. 
 
As shown throughout the study, re-establishing a judicial system in a post-
conflict situation is a task that poses significant challenges. While many of these 
challenges are unique to a particular post-conflict situation or a specific country, some 
are found in most post-conflict situations, such as a legal framework that might be out-
dated or not in accordance with international instruments protecting human rights or 
civil liberties, judicial and administrative staff that is not sufficiently trained to perform 
their jobs to a high level of professionalism, understaffed courts and non-existent 
infrastructure or infrastructure that is in a deplorable state.  
 
To address the challenge of re-establishing a judicial system, the present study 
suggests following a three-pronged approach: On the legal level, the laws and 
constitutional provisions establishing the judiciary should be reviewed to guarantee its 
independence. Furthermore, the general legislative framework in place should be 
reviewed and updated in order to be fully compliant with international standards, in 
particular with regards to the protection of human rights and the guarantees to a fair 
trial. On a personnel level, courts and prisons must be staffed sufficiently and with well-
trained personnel. In addition, on a structural level, the infrastructure required to ensure 
the functioning of the judicial system, such as courts and offices, but also prisons, which 
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tend to be overcrowded following conflicts and are often not compliant with 
international standards, should be renovated or built wherever they have been destroyed 
or have never existed prior to the conflict.  
 
When re-establishing a judicial system in a post-conflict situation, special 
attention needs to be given to transitional justice mechanisms that have been or are 
being put in place in the state concerned, as the cooperation between the judicial system 
and any additional transitional justice mechanisms is crucial. This holds particularly 
true if the judicial system and the transitional justice mechanism have concurrent 
jurisdictions. Out of the two countries used as case studies throughout this paper, the 
issue of cooperation between the judicial system and transitional justice mechanisms 
was especially important in the case of Rwanda, in which, next to the judicial system, 
an International Criminal Tribunal was set up to try the highest-level suspects and a 
series of community-based Gacaca courts was established to try the lowest-level 
suspects, leaving the western-style national judicial system to try suspects in the middle 
of the range of responsibilities.  
 
To conclude, while there is no one-size-fits-all solution to re-establishing 
judicial systems, it is clear that by drawing on lessons from the past and adapting them 
to any new post-conflict situations, the chances for success in re-establishing a judicial 
system rise.  
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8 Conclusio (German) 
 
Aufgrund ihrer präventiven Wirkung sind Justizsysteme von größter 
Wichtigkeit, um Frieden und Sicherheit in einer Gesellschaft herzustellen und zu 
gewährleisten. In vielen post-conflict-Situationen funktionieren Justizsysteme allerdings 
nicht, weil sie durch die Geschehnisse vor oder während des Konflikts zu sehr 
beschädigt wurden.  
 
Um einen Staat erfolgreich aus einer post-conflict-Situation zu führen, muss die 
Reetablierung eines unabhängigen, funktionierenden und effizienten Justizsystems eine 
der obersten Prioritäten im staatlichen Wiederaufbau sein. Internationale 
Rechtsinstrumente, wie beispielsweise die Universelle Deklaration der Menschenrechte 
oder das Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen gegen Folter und andere grausame, 
unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung und Strafe, bieten Anleitungen, wie ein 
Justizsystem unabhängig und funktionell gestaltet werden kann.  
 
Wie in der vorliegenden Arbeit gezeigt wird, stellt der Wiederaufbau von 
Justizsystemen eine besondere Herausforderung dar. Viele dieser Herausforderungen 
hängen speziell mit der jeweiligen Situation oder dem betroffenen Staat 
zusammenhängen. Einige jedoch, wie zum Beispiel ein veraltetes oder nicht 
menschenrechtskonformes gesetzliches Regelwerk, zu wenig und schlecht ausgebildetes 
juristisches und administratives Personal und fehlende oder desolate Infrastruktur, 
finden sich in den meisten post-conflict-Situationen.  
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit verwendet einen dreigeteilten Ansatz, um den 
Herausforderungen des Wiederaufbaus gerecht zu werden: Auf juristischer Ebene 
müssen die gesetzlichen und verfassungsmäßigen Grundlagen der Etablierung des 
Justizsystems überprüft werden, um dessen erforderliche Unabhängigkeit zu 
gewährleisten. Darüber hinaus müssen weitere Normen geprüft und auf den neuesten 
Stand gebracht werden, um völlig den internationalen Standards - wie dem Schutz der 
Menschenrechte und der Garantie eines fairen Prozesses - zu entsprechen. Auf 
personeller Ebene müssen Gerichte und Gefängnisse mit ausreichendem und gut 
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qualifiziertem Personal ausgestattet werden. Auf struktureller Ebene muss die 
erforderliche Infrastruktur, wie Gerichtsgebäude und Büros, aber auch Gefängnisse, die 
nach Konflikten häufig stark überbelegt und nicht menschenrechtskonform sind, 
renoviert oder neu errichtet werden.   
 
Während des Wiederaufbaus des Justizsystems muss besonderes Augenmerk auf 
Mechanismen der transitional justice gelegt werden, die im betroffenen Staat eingeführt 
worden sind oder werden, weil die Kooperation des nationalen Justizsystems mit diesen 
entscheidend ist. Dies ist ganz besonders dann der Fall, wenn Zuständigkeiten 
konkurrieren. Von den beiden Staaten, die als Fallbeispiele im Rahmen der 
vorliegenden Arbeit untersucht werden, betrifft diese Kooperation ganz besonders 
Ruanda. Dort wurden neben dem nationalen Justizsystem sowohl ein Internationales 
Tribunal, das die Speerspitze der Verdächtigen des Völkermordes vor Gericht bringt, als 
auch eine Reihe von Gemeinschaftsgerichten, sogenannten Gacaca Gerichten, etabliert, 
vor denen die Prozesse gegen Verdächtige ohne besonders starke zusätzliche Schuld 
stattfinden. Prozesse gegen Verdächtige mit mittelschwerer Schuld verbleiben bei den 
nationalen Gerichten nach westlichem Muster.  
 
Zum Abschluss lässt sich feststellen, dass keine einheitliche Lösung für den 
Wiederaufbau eines Justizsystems für alle post-conflict-Situationen existiert. Durch die 
Analyse von bereits stattgefundenen Initiativen und Projekten und deren Adaptation an 
neue post-conflict-Situationen steigen jedoch die Treffsicherheit und der Erfolg von 
Maßnahmen zum Wiederaufbau von Justizsystemen. 
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Abstract (English) 
 
Judicial systems are of utmost importance to ensuring peace and stability in a 
society. However, in post-conflict situations, they are often not functional and incapable 
of carrying out their duties. The present study aims at suggesting solutions to this 
dilemma by proposing a viable, structured approach to how a judicial system can be re-
established, taking into particular consideration the special challenges posed by the 
post-conflict situation. Furthermore, the present study examines the links between 
transitional justice mechanisms and the re-establishment of a judicial system and 
focuses on such re-establishments as part of a successful state-building exercise.  
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Abstract (German) 
 
Justizsysteme sind von größter Wichtigkeit, um Frieden und Stabilität in einer 
Gesellschaft zu gewährleisten. In vielen post-conflict-Situationen funktionieren 
Justizsysteme allerdings nicht und können daher den an sie gestellten Anforderungen 
nicht gerecht werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, Wege aus diesem 
Dilemma aufzuzeigen. Sie zeichnet einen gangbaren, strukturierten Plan vor, wie ein 
Justizsystem unter Berücksichtigung der speziellen Herausforderungen von post-
conflict-Situationen wiederaufgebaut werden kann. Darüber hinaus werden die 
Interdependenzen zwischen den Mechanismen der transitional justice und dem 
Wiederaufbau eines Justizsystems untersucht, wobei dem Wiederaufbau als Teil eines 
erfolgreichen State-building besondere Bedeutung zukommt.  
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